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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, scheduling policies have been optimized to perform well on metrics
such as throughput, delay, and fairness. In the context of shared event sched-
ulers, where a common processor is shared among multiple users, one also has
to consider the associated privacy which is a measure of the information about
the usage pattern of one user of the system that can be learned by another as a
consequence of sharing the scheduler. Consider two processes, one of them an
innocuous process (referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred
to as Bob), using a common scheduler to process their jobs. Based on when his
jobs get processed, Bob wishes to learn about the pattern (size and timing) of jobs
of Alice. Depending on the context, knowledge of this pattern could have serious
implications on Alice’s privacy and security. For instance, shared routers can re-
veal traffic patterns, shared memory access can reveal cloud usage patterns, and
so on.
We present a formal framework to study the information leakage in shared re-
source schedulers. The first-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheduling policy and time-
division-multiple-access (TDMA) are identified as two extreme policies on the
privacy metric, FCFS has the least, and TDMA has the highest. However, on per-
formance based metrics, such as throughput and delay, it is well known that FCFS
significantly outperforms TDMA. This raises the question: Is a tradeoff between
delay and privacy fundamental to the design to scheduling policies? In particular,
is there a work-conserving (a class of policies that offer minimal delay), possibly
randomized, scheduling policy that scores high on the privacy metric? Answering
the first question, we show that there does exist a fundamental limit on the privacy
performance of a work-conserving scheduling policy. We quantify this limit. Fur-
thermore, answering the second question, we demonstrate that the round-robin
scheduling policy (a deterministic policy) is privacy optimal within the class of
work-conserving policies. We then derive two parametrized policies, accumulate
and serve, and proportional TDMA, which take two different approaches to offer
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a tunable tradeoff between privacy and performance.
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To my father, for pushing me to aim high all my life. Only now do I understand
how important it was that you did it.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that resources shared between processes lead to covert
and side channels that can leak information from one process to another. A covert
communication channel is one which is not normally intended to be used for com-
munication [1]; in fact, its existence is often unknown to the system designer.
Covert channels are typically used by a trusted insider with access to a secret
piece of information to convey it to an outsider. Examples of covert channels in-
clude embedding information in the unused header files of network protocols and
two processes running on a computer communicating with each other through the
access patterns of the shared memory. In a covert channel, one process structures
its use of the shared resource in a particular pattern so as to communicate secret
information to another. Covert channels have been studied extensively in the con-
text of multi-level secure systems, where they can be used to create forbidden
information flows [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
In contrast to a covert channel, in a side channel, one process tries to learn
something about the operation of another without the latter’s cooperation. Side
channels, therefore, focus on information that is leaked incidentally by a victim
process, rather than explicitly coded by a sender. Examples of such channels
include an attacker non-invasively improving his odds of guessing cryptographic
keys used by a crypto-system by observing its instantaneous power usage [7], and
making use of the fact that the power usage for a certain set of CPU operations
is higher than others. Another example is an eavesdropper trying to guess the
underlying communication by observing the encrypted packets flowing across a
link [8] and making use of the fact that the encryption does not alter the volume
and timing of packets flowing on the link.
In this thesis, we consider the timing side channel that exists inside of a shared
scheduler. A timing side channel is one in which information is conveyed (leaked)
through the timings of various events. Schedulers are used in multi-tasking sys-
tems where they dictate how a finite resource is to be divided among several com-
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Figure 1.1: An abstraction of a shared scheduling system.
peting processes. Examples of such systems include hardware resources (CPU,
storage, buses) inside of a computer being shared among different processes, mul-
tiple network streams flowing through a common router, a cloud-based shared
computing infrastructure, etc. In such systems, the quality of service experienced
by one user of the system is directly influenced by the activities of the other users
of the system. For example, a sudden slowdown in web access speeds of one user
could indicate an increase in network usage from the other users sharing the same
network infrastructure. In this manner, a shared scheduler incidentally creates a
timing side channel through which a malicious user could potentially learn about
the activities of the other users of the system.
For the remainder of this thesis, these systems are abstracted out as a processor
being shared by multiple users, as shown in Figure 1.1. Jobs arrive from multiple
users to the scheduler. The processor can work on only one job at a time. The
scheduler queues up the incoming jobs and dynamically divides the processor
time among these competing jobs. In this manner, the delays experienced by jobs
from one user are directly influenced by the number, timing, and size of the jobs
issued by the other users.
Some of the commonly used schedulers are the following:
1. first-come-first-served (FCFS): jobs are served in the order they are issued
to the scheduler.
2. time-division-multiple-access (TDMA): each user is pre-assigned time slots
during which the processor serves only jobs from that user.
3. round-robin (RR): one job is served from each of the queued up users in
succession.
4. priority schedulers: one class of jobs is served ahead of another class of
jobs according to some pre-defined rule.
5. shortest-job-first (SJF): a particular type of priority scheduler where jobs
that require lesser time to be processed are served first.
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Figure 1.2: An event/packet scheduler being exploited by a malicious user to
infer the arrival pattern from the other.
Each of these schedulers is optimized to perform well on a different performance
metric, such as: throughput, the number of job completions per unit time; average
delay, the mean time difference between the job completion and the job arrival;
fairness, a metric to measure if the resource is being distributed equally/fairly
among the processes, etc. As with any engineered system, a system designer
has to make a calculated tradeoff among these conflicting metrics while picking a
suitable scheduler. We argue that while choosing a scheduler that serves jobs from
multiple non-trusting users, one has to consider the associated privacy along with
the other metrics. In this work, we explore the resulting tradeoffs one has to make
if privacy is taken into account.
We consider the scenario when a scheduler is serving jobs from two users,
where one of them is an innocuous user and other a malicious one. The malicious
user, Bob, wishes to learn the pattern of jobs sent by the innocuous user, Alice.
Bob exploits the fact that when the processor is busy serving jobs from Alice, his
own jobs experience a delay. As shown in Figure 1.2, Bob computes the delays
experienced by his jobs and uses these delays to infer the times when Alice tried
to access the processor, and possibly the sizes of jobs scheduled. Learning this
traffic pattern from Alice can aid Bob in carrying out traffic analysis attacks.
1.1 A Motivating Example
Consider the scenario shown in Figure 1.3. Alice, is using her computer at home
to connect to the Internet. She connects by using a home DSL router, which
connects to a router at her Internet service provider (ISP), connecting to the In-
ternet. The ISP sees all the traffic that Alice sends; however, Alice is not worried
because she knows that she is protected by anti-wiretapping legislation. Along
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Figure 1.3: A possible exploitation of the timing side channel present inside of a
DSL router.
comes Bob, who is located at another ISP entirely, perhaps even in another coun-
try. Bob sends a probe stream to Alice’s router. The probes are frequent, but small
in size. Most importantly, the probes (and responses) make use of a shared queue
at Alice’s ISP’s side of the DSL link. As a result, the waiting time of the probes is
correlated with Alice’s traffic patterns. The traffic entering Alice’s computer and
Bob’s RTTs are shown in Figures 1.3 (b) and (c), and there is a clear correlation
between the two. The fact that DSL routers employ FCFS scheduling aided the
attack. In [9], we show that the high correlation between the two also holds if
the DSL router employed round-robin instead. Such an attack gives the attacker
a noisy observation of the timing and the sizes of packets entering Alice’s com-
puter. Although the contents of the packets are not revealed, learning such timing
information opens up the possibility for the attacker to carry out remote traffic
analysis. In [10], Gong et al. exploit this very side channel to infer the website
being visited by the victim. They were correctly able to identify the website being
visited 70% of the time! Some other instances of traffic analysis include recov-
ery of information about keystrokes typed [11, 12], websites visited [13, 14], or
words spoken over VoIP [15]. In all these works, the attacker observes Alice’s
traffic and uses statistical inference techniques to carry out the attack. Clearly,
there is much to be learned from the timing and sizes of packets alone. Such
side channels exist not only in network routers, but in any system with shared
resources. In [16], Ristenpart et al. map the internal infrastructure of Amazon’s
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EC2 cloud computing service, and demonstrate that it is possible for an attacker
to place a virtual machine (VM) on the same physical computer as the target’s
VM, from which point any timing channel created by sharing of the processor can
be exploited by the attacker. In cryptographic side channels, the attacker aims to
recover cryptographic keys by utilizing the timing variations required for crypto-
graphic operations [17, 18]. The strength of the side channel attack lies in the fact
that it does not require special access or privileges for the attacker. It is therefore
important to study these timing side channels and design schedulers to minimize
the information leakage.
A summary of our main contributions follows.
1. Development of an analytical framework to characterize the privacy per-
formance of a scheduling policy. While evaluating the privacy performance
of a scheduling policy, we consider the scenario described in Figure 1.2,
where Alice, the innocuous user, and Bob, the malicious user, are the only
two users of the system. Arrivals from Alice are modeled as a Poisson pro-
cess. Bob, on the other hand, is allowed to pick the time and size of the jobs
he issues to a scheduler. Furthermore, he is assumed to know the schedul-
ing policy being used. The privacy offered by the policy is defined as the
mean square error incurred by Bob when estimating Alice’s arrival pattern
when he picks an optimal attack strategy. The higher the error, the better
the policy at protecting the privacy of the users.
2. Evaluation of the privacy metric of commonly deployed scheduling policies.
FCFS is one of the most commonly deployed scheduling policies owing
to its simplicity. It is throughput-optimal and results in minimal queuing
delay. However, by the nature of the policy, there is a large correlation
between the waiting times of jobs of one user and the arrival pattern of the
other. Consequently, as shown in Section 4.3 by the explicit construction
of one attack strategy, FCFS is the weakest policy on the privacy metric.
On the other hand, TDMA, wherein the delays experienced by jobs of one
user are completely independent of the arrivals of the other, ranks highest
on the privacy metric. However, TDMA is a highly inefficient policy in
terms of throughput and delay, especially when the traffic is varying. It is
especially inefficient when the number of users using the scheduler is large.
Round-robin is another throughput-optimal scheduling policy which is also
known to be fair. In Section 5.2, we evaluate the privacy performance of
this policy. Although it is better than FCFS, we demonstrate that there is
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a considerable gap between the privacy performances of the round-robin
policy and TDMA, thus suggesting that it can be greatly improved upon.
3. Bounding the privacy performance of the class of work-conserving poli-
cies. Work-conserving (also known as non-idling) policies are those that
ensure that the processor never idles as long as there is an un-served job
in the system. When all the jobs are the same size, this is the class of
delay-optimal scheduling policies. All policies that belong to this class
are also throughput-optimal. FCFS and round-robin are examples of work-
conserving policies, TDMA is not. In Section 5.2, it is proved that round-
robin is a privacy-optimal policy within this class. Hence, the privacy metric
of this policy bounds the privacy metric of every other work-conserving pol-
icy. As stated earlier, there is a considerable difference between the round-
robin and TDMA policies on the privacy metric. A surprising corollary to
this result is that a private source of randomness at the scheduler does not
help it, if it is forced to pick a work-conserving policy. For example, con-
sider a policy that randomly switches from serving jobs in FCFS manner to
serving jobs in round-robin manner to serving jobs from the user with the
longest queue. Because the times when the policy switches behavior are
unknown to the attacker, one might expect this policy to outperform deter-
ministic scheduling policies. However, this is not the case. This proves the
existence of a fundamental privacy-delay tradeoff in the design of a schedul-
ing policy. If one were to design provably secure scheduling policies, they
should allow for idling.
4. Design policies that offer good privacy-delay tradeoffs. We design two
parametric policies, accumulate-and-serve and proportional-TDMA which
can be tuned to tradeoff delay for improved privacy. Unlike TDMA, both
these policies are throughput-optimal. Investigating the highest levels of
privacy a policy could offer for a given delay constraint is an important
problem, and is an open problem.
5. Exploitation of the timing side channel in a multi-user scenario. When there
are several users sharing a scheduler, the information that an attacker can
learn about the activities of the other other is reduced, compared to the two-
user case. However, this side channel can be exploited for other nefarious
activities. As an example, we design a flow-linking attack which can be
used to infer if there is a common flow between two routers or not, which
can be used to break the anonymity of the users of an anonymizing network
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such as the Tor network.
1.2 Organization of the Thesis
In the following chapter, we give a brief overview on some of the relevant works in
the areas of covert and side channels. In Chapter 3 we discuss the system model
in detail and introduce the privacy metric that we use throughout the thesis. In
Chapter 4, we prove that TDMA scores the highest on the privacy metric while
FCFS scores the lowest. We next consider another important metric of perfor-
mance, the delay added by a scheduling policy. FCFS adds minimal delay while
TDMA results in the addition of excessive delay. The focus of the thesis is the
study of the privacy-delay tradeoff that is inherent in the design of a scheduling
policy. The existence of such a tradeoff is shown in Chapter 5, where we derive
an upper bound on the privacy performance of all work-conserving policies. We
show that there is a large gap between the privacy offered by policies belonging
to this class and TDMA. Within this class, proved in Section 5.2, round-robin is
a privacy-optimal policy. In Chapter 6, we consider the design of provably secure
scheduling policies, and derive two of them. The delay performance of all the
policies considered here is given in Chapter 7. A flow-linking attack is discussed
in Chapter 8. Finally, we conclude with some discussion on how the results de-
rived in this thesis can be generalized.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Often, the timings of various events carry sensitive contextual information about
the events themselves. In the context of networks, it has been recognized that en-
cryption alone is insufficient to protect the contents of the packets [19]. The timing
and sizes of packets flowing on a link carry information as well, as demonstrated
in [20], wherein the identity of a video clip is guessed based on observing stream-
ing encrypted data. In the context of cryptography, the time it takes a processor to
perform a cryptographic operation can reveal secret keys [18, 21]. Inter-keystroke
timing information reveals information on the word being typed [11]. Duration of
web-based transactions can potentially leak private information held at the server,
e.g. the number of private photos in a publicly viewable gallery or the number of
items in a shopping cart of an Internet retailer [22].
Typical defenses to mitigate timing-based leakage include ensuring that all the
response times are the same [23], or adding random noise to the response times
[18, 24]. However, the distribution of response times of many applications is
skewed [25]; that is, the worst case response time is significantly longer than the
average case response time. This makes the first solution to this problem infeasible
in certain systems. In certain scenarios, the attacker can repeatedly carry out the
attack to average out the noise added, rendering the second approach ineffective
[18].
Our work falls into the broad category of the study of “spying” channels. These
are communication channels which have historically been used by spies either to
interact secretly among themselves—typically, an insider with access to a secret
piece of information leaking it to an outsider using covert and steganographic
channels—or to spy on the activity of others through a side channel. More often
than not, the information is transmitted, or extracted via timing. In the following,
we give examples of these channels and suggested countermeasures. In all the
figures, the users Alice and Oscar denote innocuous users who are unaware of the
fact that they might be spied upon. Users Bob and Eve are malicious spies; Eve is
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Figure 2.1: A timing covert communication channel in which the conspirators
Eve and Bob exploit a system to exchange messages.
the insider with the information which she wishes to communicate to Bob.
Figure 2.1 shows the working of a covert channel wherein, Eve communicates
to Bob in a manner so that nobody is aware of the existence of their conversation.
All they share is an intermediate system, e.g., a processor or a network link. They
make use of the fact that any dynamically shared resource is a channel. If a process
sees any different result due to another process’s operation, there is a channel be-
tween them. If a resource is shared between two processes, such that one process
might wait or not depending on the other’s action, then the wait can be observed
and there is a timing channel [26]. Simultaneous multithread (SMT) processors
run many processes concurrently, sharing most of the processor resources. Wang
and Lee [27] describe a scenario in which one process uses up either all or none
of the multipliers on board to covertly convey a message to another process, who
receives this signal by concurrently trying to use the multipliers and observing the
delay. Cabuk et al. [28] demonstrate a network timing channel over IP. The pres-
ence or absence of a packet in a timing interval is used to convey a message. Liu
et al. [29] provide an example of a timing channel being used as a robust covert
channel. These channels are usually hard to detect, but are nevertheless important
to analyze and mitigate. Under US Trusted Computer System Evaluation Crite-
ria (TCSEC), covert channel analysis is required starting at B2 level of assurance
[30]. Refer to [31] for a survey of articles pertaining to covert channels. We next
discuss a few mitigation schemes.
In their seminal work, Ananthram and Verdu´ [32] study the capacity of a covert
timing channel where Eve communicates to Bob through the timing of packets she
transmits to him. An intermediate FCFS queuing system adds noise to the timing
information, by buffering each packet for a random time before transmitting it.
They show that, if the delays added by the queue are independent and identically
distributed, of all the distributions with the same mean D, the capacity of the
channel is minimized when the delays added have an exponential distribution.
Giles and Hajek in [33] study a generalized version of the covert timing chan-
nel, wherein the queuing system is replaced by a jammer that can delay packets
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Figure 2.2: A timing steganographic communication channel in which the
conspirators Eve and Bob exploit a system to exchange messages. Unlike over a
covert channel, Eve can only modulate the cover traffic generated by Alice.
arbitrarily subject to a delay constraint. They show that the “best” jammer is one
that buffers up jobs until the nearest multiple of a time D and then dumps the
outputs. Such a jammer is guaranteed to delay a packet by a time at most D for
any input process. The authors also develop good jamming strategies that are con-
strained by the average delay they add, or by the buffer size used. It is important
to note a difference between this work and that in [32]. In [32], Ananthram and
Verdu´ look for the best jammer within the class of queuing disciplines with fixed
mean service time (the time it takes for a packet to depart the system once it enters
service), whereas in this work, Giles and Hajek look for the best jammer within
the class of jammers with a fixed queuing delay (this is the time spent by a packet
in the queue waiting for service plus the time it takes for the server to serve the
packet). A queue with a fixed service time does not guarantee a bound on the
maximum or the average queuing time for arbitrary input processes.
A recent work by Askarov et al. [34] considers a scenario where the input pro-
cesses are of finite duration and propose a mitigation scheme (jamming strategy)
that guarantees asymptotically lower capacity than the strategy proposed in [33].
However, the authors do not explicitly consider the delay added by their strategy,
which leads to a mitigation scheme that adds unacceptable amounts of delay for
reasonably long inputs [35]. In fact, the mitigation scheme they design can poten-
tially add unbounded amounts of delay for certain input processes, rendering the
system unstable.
A variant of the covert communication channel is the steganographic channel
in which the adversary Eve cannot actively generate events, but can modulate the
timing of events generated by an innocuous user Alice as depicted in Figure 2.2.
In [36], Wang and Moulin consider the scenario wherein Alice generates a source
code according to some distribution. Eve then embeds a message into this source
code without distorting it by much, while also ensuring that the empirical distribu-
tion of the distorted code matches the distribution of the original source code. The
system then adds noise to this distorted message which is then received by Bob.
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Figure 2.3: A timing side channel in which the information about the innocuous
user Alice is spied on by a malicious observer Bob.
The authors consider the case when the mitigator is a discrete memoryless channel
(DMC), and derive the maximum rate at which Eve can reliably communicate to
Bob. Obviously, the data rates achievable through such channels are smaller than
those achievable by covert channels, but the covert communication is also harder
to detect. Note that a timing channel (e.g. the queuing channel) is typically not a
memoryless channel, i.e., the current output of the channel depends not only on
the current input to the channel, but the past inputs as well. For this reason, the
results derived herein do not carry over to timing channels. Jitterbug is an exam-
ple of a timing steganographic channel [37]. The authors modify a keyboard at
the hardware level in a way that each time a key is pressed, instead of generating
an event immediately, it delays the generation of the event. This is done in such
a way as to encode the inter-keystroke timing information. This information can
later be recovered and used to guess passwords typed. Steganographic channels
are closely related to watermarking, wherein the cover traffic (traffic generated
by Alice) is perturbed slightly. This perturbation serves as a signature for the
traffic and can be tracked. This idea has been used previously for SSH stepping
stone correlation [38] and for tracking VoIP calls [39]. The work [35] considers
a steganographic timing channel from a mitigator’s perspective. The authors de-
rive jamming strategies, similar to those derived in [34], which bound the rate at
which Eve can communicate to Bob. Again, delay is not explicitly considered
while designing the jamming strategy, and no claim is made about its optimality.
In a covert channel, the transmitter and the receiver of the secret information
conspire with each other, so they can agree on a communication strategy ahead
of time. This is not the case in a side channel, where the transmitter of the in-
formation is usually unaware of the fact that she is being spied upon. Figure 2.3
is a pictorial representation of a side channel. The shared cache memory in a
CPU leads to a side channel which can be exploited to steal cryptographic keys
[27, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Side-channel leakage can also occur in contexts outside of
cryptographic algorithms themselves. Song et al. [11] describe a timing attack on
the inter-keystroke timing of an interactive SSH connection.
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Figure 2.4: A wiretap channel. Alice wishes to communicate to Oscar through
the use of the main channel. However, they are aware of the presence of an
eavesdropper Bob who is listening to their communication through a wiretap
channel.
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Figure 2.5: A timing side channel with an active adversary.
One of the earliest works on the study of capacity of side channels was by
Wyner in [44], extended by Csisza´r and Korner in [45]. These works considered
a wiretap channel, shown in Figure 2.4. Alice wishes to communicate secretly to
Oscar using the main DMC. They are aware of the presence of an eavesdropper
Bob who is wiretapping their communication through a degraded DMC. The au-
thors compute the secrecy capacity of such a channel, i.e., the maximum rate at
which they can communicate without Bob being able to infer the message.
In the area of timing side channels, a large body of literature exists on the
anonymity analysis of Chaum mixes; refer to [46, 47]. Alice and Oscar issue
packets to a Chaum mix. The mix buffers these packets and releases them later
on. Bob observes the input and the output streams. His task is to guess whether an
output packet was sent by Alice or Oscar, and it is the mix’s job to obfuscate him.
Subject to a delay constraint at the mix, Venkitasubramaniam and Anantharam in
[46] compute upper and lower bounds to the anonymity provided by this system.
In [47], Ghaderi and Srikant consider the same problem, but when the output link
has a finite capacity.
In this work, we study a variant of this problem, a side channel with an active
adversary, as shown in Figure 2.5. Two users Eve and Bob coordinate their actions
to learn about the activity of an innocuous user Alice. In this scenario, Eve can
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actively generate events as well, and can do so in a manner that is favorable to Bob,
the spy. In [48], the authors consider the scenario where a client is connected to
a rogue website using a TOR network, which is designed to protect the identity
of the users. The website modulates the traffic sent to the client. The website can
then try to simultaneously send data through each of the TOR nodes and measure
the delay incurred. By correlating this delay with the traffic it sent to the client,
the website can obtain its identity, thus defeating the purpose of TOR. While that
attack is no longer viable [49], the reason is that there are many more TOR nodes
now than there were when [48] was published, and not because the timing based
side channel has been eliminated. In [10], Gong et al. exploit the side channel in a
DSL router to infer the website being visited by the victim. A similar side channel
exists within Amazon’s EC2 cloud computing service, which is exploited in [16].
The countermeasures against side channel leakage fall into the following cate-
gories:
1. System specific: The most common mitigation technique against crypto-
graphic side channels is blinding [50, 18]: If x is the input to the crypto
system which then returns f(x), the input is first transformed to E(x), and
the crypto system then returns f(E(x)), which is then used to obtain f(x).
The function E(·) is randomized making recovery of x difficult. In the con-
text of language-based security, Agat [51] introduces a program transforma-
tion to remove timing side channels from programs written in a sequential
imperative programming language. The NRL Pump is proposed for mitigat-
ing timing channels that arise in multilevel security systems (MLS) when a
high-confidentiality process can communicate through acknowledgments it
sends to a low-confidentiality process [52].
2. Demand independent resource allocation: As suggested in [27, 53, 43, 42],
if the shared resource is statically allocated to various users of the system,
then there is no side channel. However, this solution often leads to a loss
in performance. Also, in applications like cloud-based shared computing
infrastructure, the revenue model assumes dynamic sharing of resources.
3. Randomization: In certain scenarios, the manner in which the system allo-
cates resources can be randomized to obfuscate an attacker [27, 54]. In the
network pump [52], the pump adds a random delay to the acknowledgments
it sends to the low process.
4. Pre-emption: By pre-emption, we mean suspension of processing of a job
which can later be resumed. This can be used to hide from the attacker, the
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true size of the job being processed. This idea is used in [55] to obfuscate
an attacker observing the size and timing of packets flowing through the
network.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the system model we consider. It will be clear that
these techniques lead to solutions which are clearly sub-optimal (i.e. one can
design policies which add fewer delay) or are not applicable at all.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this chapter, we formally introduce a model of the scheduling system, and
introduce a metric which measures the strength of the policy in preserving the
privacy of the users. The scheduler is modeled as an infinite buffer server that is
serving jobs from two users. The scheduler can serve jobs at a rate of one per
unit time. We consider the scenario when one of them is an innocuous user and
the other malicious. The malicious user, Bob, wishes to exploit the queuing side
channel described earlier to learn about the pattern of jobs sent by the innocuous
user, Alice. Bob is assumed to know accurately the time when his jobs are issued,
and the time it took for the scheduler to process it, i.e. the difference between the
completion time of the job and the time when it was issued. Knowing the delays
experienced by his jobs, Bob uses this information to guess the arrival pattern of
jobs from Alice.
Bob’s ability to learn about Alice’s arrival process depends heavily on Alice’s
arrival process itself. For example, on-off patterns are easier to detect reliably than
an arrival process that is less bursty. In order to ensure that the scheduling policies
we design are robust to a variety of arrival patterns, Alice’s arrival process will
be modeled as a Poisson process of rate λ2, with all the jobs of unit size. We do
this partly because Poisson processes are known to have maximum entropy rate
among processes of a given rate [56], and hence represent a rich class of arrival
processes, and also because the closed-form expressions which can be derived
reveal the nature of tradeoffs between privacy and delay. We will also consider the
scenario when Bob knows the value of λ2, the mean rate at which traffic arrives
from Alice. A policy that guards the privacy of Alice in this scenario will also
perform well when the attacker does not know a priori this rate.
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3.1 Measuring the Strength of the Scheduling Policy:
A Privacy Metric
Alice issues unit sized jobs to the scheduler according to a Poisson process of rate
λ2. The total number of jobs issued by Alice until time u is given by AA(u). The
malicious user, Bob, also referred to as the attacker, issues his jobs at times tn1
.
=
{t1, t2, . . . , tn}, and is free to choose their sizes, sn1 .= {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, as well.1
Let t′n1
.
= {t′1, t′2, . . . , t′n} be the departure times of these jobs. Bob makes use of
the observations available to him, the set {tn1 , sn1 , t′n1 } and the knowledge of the
scheduling policy used, in estimating Alice’s arrival pattern. The arrival pattern
of Alice is the sequence {Xk}k=1,2,...,N , where Xk = AA(kc) −AA((k − 1)c), is
the number of jobs issued by Alice in the interval ((k− 1)c, kc], referred to as the
kth clock period of duration c. Nc is the time horizon over which the attacker is
interested in learning Alice’s arrival pattern.
The privacy offered by the scheduling system can be measured in a multitude
of ways. We consider the following definition of privacy.
Pc,λ2,l(·,·)Scheduling policy =
lim
N→∞
min
n,tn1 ,s
n
1 :
n∑
i=1
si
Nc
<1−λ2
1
N
N∑
k=1
min
gNk (·)
E
[
l
(
Xk, g
N
k (t
n
1 , s
n
1 , t
′n
1 )
)]
, (3.1)
where l(·, ·) is a non-negative loss function and gNk (tn1 , sn1 , t′
n
1 ) is Bob’s estimate of
Xk. The privacy is measured in terms of the long run loss incurred by the attacker,
Bob, when he uses his observations to estimate the arrival pattern of Alice. Bob is
free to decide the number of jobs he issues, times when he issues them and their
sizes, subject to a maximum rate constraint, and he optimally estimates Alice’s
arrival pattern. Surprisingly, most of the results derived next are independent of
the choice of the loss function. To keep things concrete, we will discuss all our
results by fixing the loss function to the squared loss function, l(x, y) = (x− y)2.
In Chapter 9, we prove that all the results derived henceforth are applicable for
general loss functions as well.
For the rest of this thesis, we focus on the following estimation error based
1We also worked on a version of this problem where the attacker is also forced to issue jobs
only of unit size. Many of the results derived here carry over in that scenario as well; refer to [57]
and [58]. However, the attacker uses a large amount of bandwidth in just sampling the state of the
system, which limits the set of the available attack strategies.
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privacy metric.
Ec,λ2Scheduling policy =
lim
N→∞
min
n,tn1 ,s
n
1 :
n∑
i=1
si
Nc
<1−λ2
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E
[
Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1
])2]
, (3.2)
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of the arrival times of
Alice’s jobs, the arrival times and sizes of jobs from Bob and his departure times.
This joint distribution is in turn dependent on the scheduling policy used, which is
known to the attacker, Bob. Finally, the attacker is assumed to know the statistical
description of Alice’s arrival process, and he is allowed to pick
n∑
i=1
si/Nc, the
average rate at which to issue jobs, to be any value that is less than 1 − λ2, so as
to keep the system stable. A scheduling policy is said to preserve the privacy of
its users if the resulting estimation error is high.
Our motivation for using the minimum mean squared error (MMSE) as a metric
of performance is as follows. The minimum mean squared error, as considered in
this work, does not conform to a specific adversarial learning technique, but serves
as a universal lower bound over all adversarial strategies taking into account the
complete available information for the entire duration of the system operation.
A natural alternative metric would be to measure the information leakage using
Shannon’s equivocation lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
k=1H(Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 ). While entropy serves as
a measure of uncertainty, which guarantees a minimum probability of error for an
adversary (Fano’s inequality), MMSE bounds the actual error incurred. The pur-
pose of quantifying privacy is to have a meaningful measure of how breachable
a system is, and in that respect, both these measures provide that interpretation.
Furthermore, the two metrics are related in the sense that both MMSE and en-
tropy are functionals of the probability mass function of the same conditional ran-
dom variable, Xk|tn1 , t′n1 , sn1 . MMSE is the variance of the random variable, while
equivocation is the entropy of the random variable. It can be shown, using proof
techniques similar to those in [59], that large estimation error does correspond
to large entropy, although the relationship between the two is not monotonic. In
Chapter 9 it will proved that our results apply to the entropy-based privacy metric
as well.
In this work we only consider the case when there are two users of the system,
the innocuous user and the attacker. From a privacy perspective, the two-user
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scenario is the worst case. It is true that if there are more users of the system,
the attacker can only learn less fine-grained information about the arrival pattern
from the targeted user. However, as stated in [16], in such systems, the attacker
typically waits for a time when he can be assured that the victim is the only other
user of the scheduling system and launches an attack then. A policy that fares well
on the privacy metric in the two user scenario is also guaranteed to perform well
in the multiple user scenario.
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CHAPTER 4
PERFORMANCE OF FCFS AND TDMA ON
THE PRIVACY METRIC
In this chapter, we prove that the FCFS and TDMA are two extreme policies on
the privacy metric, FCFS offers the least privacy while TDMA offers the highest.
4.1 An Upper Bound on the Estimation Error of the
Attacker
In order to gauge the amount of information that the attacker learns through this
side channel, it is important to first study the amount of information that the at-
tacker has even before performing any attack. In our case, the attacker is assumed
to know the statistical description that governs the arrival pattern from Alice, that
it is a Poisson traffic of rate λ2. In this section, we compute the estimation error in-
curred by the attacker when he uses just this statistical description to estimate Al-
ice’s arrival pattern. This is the maximum estimation error that a rational attacker
can incur, and will also serve as a benchmark to test the efficacy of a scheduling
policy in preserving Alice’s privacy.
Theorem 4.1. Irrespective of the scheduling policy used, the maximum estimation
error that the attacker can incur is λ2c.
Proof. When Alice’s traffic is a Poisson λ2 traffic, the number of arrivals in be-
tween two clock ticks, Xk, is a Poisson random variable with parameter λ2c. Also
Xks are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Ignoring all the obser-
vations available to him, viz. {tn1 , t′n1 , sn1}, if Bob estimates Xk with its statistical
mean, λ2c, for all k, the mean estimation error incurred by him is equal to the vari-
ance of the Poisson random variable, which is λ2c. Note that the statistical mean
is the best estimate of Xk in the absence of any other information. Formally,
argminy E
[
(Xk − y)2
]
= E[Xk] = λ2c.
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Define
Ec,λ2Max .= λ2c (4.1)
≥ Ec,λ2Scheduling Policy. (4.2)
Making a clever use of his observations, the attacker, Bob, can potentially perform
a better job at guessing Alice’s arrival process, thereby incurring a lower estima-
tion error. A good scheduling policy should have an estimation error as close to
Ec,λ2Max as possible.
4.2 Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) Policy
Achieves the Maximum Privacy
If the scheduler uses a time-division-multiple-access (TDMA) policy, it allocates
dedicated time slots to process jobs from each user. For instance, when there are
only two users, the scheduler could assign the odd time slots to serve jobs from
the first user, and even time slots to process jobs from the other. If there are no
unserved jobs from one of the users, the scheduler just idles in the correspond-
ing time slots. Such a policy is sometimes not practical, as user’s job patterns
are rarely periodic and could therefore incur severe delays. Moreover, the pol-
icy places a hard limit on each user’s available processor time to half the total
available time, resulting in poor resource utilization [60, 61]. The delay issues are
further discussed in Chapter 7.
For such a policy, the arrival pattern of one user does not influence the comple-
tion times of jobs in the other. In this scenario, the attacker can do nothing better
than use his knowledge of the Alice’s arrival statistics to guess the arrival pattern.
Therefore, the estimation error incurred would be Ec,λ2TDMA = λ2c. This means that
from an privacy perspective, TDMA is an optimal albeit impractical scheduling
policy.
4.3 FCFS Offers the Least Privacy
The FCFS scheduling policy serves jobs in the order in which they arrive. Al-
though this policy is easy to implement, and fares well in the metrics of through-
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put and mean delay, as we will demonstrate, it does not perform well in terms of
preserving the privacy of a user. For the system model considered here, the fol-
lowing theorem can be proved. It states that the estimation error incurred by Bob
when FCFS scheduling policy is used is equal to zero when he issues arbitrarily
small jobs at a high enough rate.
Theorem 4.2. FCFS policy offers no privacy to its users. Specifically, for a fixed
arrival rate from Alice, λ2, the estimation error incurred by the strongest attacker
is equal to zero. That is,
Ec,λ2FCFS = 0. (4.3)
Proof. We prove this theorem by specifying one particular attack strategy, i.e.,
one set of arrival times and sizes of the jobs from the attacker which guarantees
zero error. The attacker, Bob, issues one job every c/dce time units, where dce
is the smallest integer greater than or equal to c. The size of each job is λc/dce,
so that the rate at which he issues jobs is equal to λ. Therefore tk = kc/dce and
sk = λc/dce. Let t′n1 be the departure times of his jobs, and X˜k be the number of
jobs issued by Alice in between times (k − 1)c/dce and kc/dce. Recall that Xk is
the number of jobs issued by Alice in between times (k − 1)c and kc. Therefore,
Xk =
dce∑
i=1
X˜(k−1)dce+i. This means if the attacker estimates the sequence {X˜k}
accurately, he can estimate the sequence {Xk} accurately as well. Note that the
time between successive arrivals from the attacker is c/dce < 1. The size of a job
from Alice is 1. Hence the attacker can accurately learn whether Alice issued a
job between two of his jobs or not. His estimation procedure is the follows.
Consider first the scenario when t′k−1 < tk, that is, his k−1th job departs before
the arrival of the kth job. In this case, suppose X˜k = 0, then t
′
k = tk + sk; i.e.,
the kth job goes into service immediately upon its arrival. On the other hand, if
X˜k > 0, then tk + sk + X˜k − 1 < t′k < tk + sk + X˜k, which implies X˜k =
dt′k − (tk + sk)e. Now, suppose t′k−1 > tk; i.e., the k − 1th job from the attacker
departs after the arrival of his kth job. In this case, X˜k = t
′
k − sk − t′k−1. These
scenarios are depicted in Figure 4.1.
Clearly, X˜k is a deterministic function of tk−1, t
′
k−1, tk, t
′
k and sk. Therefore,
the attacker incurs zero error in estimating Alice’s arrival pattern.
Next we present some remarks about the result derived above. For the attack
strategy specified in Theorem 4.2, the attacker, Bob, incurs zero error independent
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Figure 4.1: Possible arrival and departure patterns when FCFS policy is used at
the scheduler. In all these plots, the solid arrows are jobs from the attacker, and
the dotted ones are jobs issued by Alice. The size of the arrows denotes the size
of the jobs. Upward pointing arrows denote the arrival times, and downward
pointing ones denote the departures.
of his rate λ. This means that he can estimate Alice’s arrival pattern exactly even
when he is permitted to issue jobs at an arbitrarily small rate. This is the case
because Alice’s jobs are of size 1 and as long as the attacker issues jobs at a
frequency greater than 1, Alice’s arrivals can be estimated exactly. Note that the
size of jobs issued by him can be arbitrarily small.
As an aside, the result of the theorem can easily be extended to the case when
the job sizes of Alice are of arbitrary sizes (for example, when the job sizes from
Alice are exponentially distributed). The attack strategy in such a scenario would
be the follows. Bob issues one job every δ units of time, and the size of each job
is λδ. His estimate of Alice’s arrivals is the follows. If t′k−1 < tk and t
′
k = tk+ sk,
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then he estimates the number of arrivals from Alice between times tk−1 and tk
to be zero. If t′k−1 < tk and t
′
k > tk + sk, then he estimates the number of
arrivals from Alice between times tk−1 and tk to be t
′
k − (tk + sk). And finally
if t′k−1 > tk, then he estimates the number of arrivals to be t
′
k − sk − t′k−1. Like
before, the estimation is accurate in the third scenario. However, in the first two
scenarios, some error could be incurred. Nonetheless, the error is bounded by
δ2. Therefore, by choosing δ small enough, the attacker can incur close to zero
estimation error.
This suggests two possible alterations to the FCFS policy which could lead to a
higher estimation error for the attacker. First, the policy could limit the frequency
at which a user can issue jobs to the system, by imposing a minimum inter-arrival
time. This could be done by having a token-bucket filter [62]. Second, the sched-
uler could impose a restriction on the smallest size of a job, perhaps by idling for
a short while after serving a small job. While these mechanisms look promising,
it is easy to see that they hurt the performance of the system in terms of a smaller
throughput region (if the scheduler starts idling) and/or adding to the overall de-
lay. In Chapter 5, we will first look for policies that do not idle. This is the class
of work-conserving policies which are also a class of delay-optimal policies.
To sum up, FCFS offers very little privacy to its users. Though from a privacy
perspective TDMA is an optimal scheduling policy, by reserving slots for users,
TDMA loses out on benefits of statistical multiplexing, and is neither throughput
nor delay optimal. By throughput optimality, we mean the following. Suppose
there are m users using the scheduler to process their jobs, and user i issues unit
sized jobs at a rate λi, and the scheduler can process 1 unit of job in a unit interval
of time. It can be shown that the system stays stable, i.e., the queue sizes do not
blow to infinity, for any values of the input rates as long as they satisfy
m∑
i=1
λi < 1
if the scheduler uses a work-conserving policy. However, if the scheduler used
TDMA instead, then for the system to be stable, we would require λi < 1/m,
which significantly shrinks the rate region over which the system stays stable. In
Chapter 5, we will introduce a class of throughput and delay-optimal scheduling
policies and look for policies in this class which also fare well on the privacy
metric.
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CHAPTER 5
PRIVACY PERFORMANCE OF
WORK-CONSERVING POLICIES
Delay plays a crucial role in several applications, e.g., real-time tasks running
on a processor. It is important for a scheduler to introduce minimal delay. The
delay incurred by the jobs at the scheduler is dependent on the arrival processes
themselves. For instance, if many jobs arrive at the scheduler at the same time, as
opposed to their arrivals being spread out evenly in time, incurring a higher delay
at the scheduler is inevitable. In this work, we consider the delay incurred by the
jobs in the normal mode of operation of the scheduler, in which all the users of the
system are innocuous users. The delay offered by a scheduling policy is defined
as the average delay incurred by a job (averaged across all users of the scheduler)
when multiple users issue unit-sized jobs according to Poisson processes.
As mentioned before, a scheduling policy that has been optimized to perform
best on one of the metrics is most likely not the best in another. The sub-optimality
of TDMA on the delay metric arises as a result of the scheduler taking vacations;
i.e., TDMA allows for the scheduler to stay idle even when there are unserved
jobs waiting in the queue to be served. Schedulers which do not allow for this are
said to be work-conserving, or non-idling.
Theorem 5.1. When all the jobs are of the same size, all non-preemptive,1 work-
conserving policies have the same average delay.
Proof. For the purposes of characterizing the average delay incurred across all the
jobs, one can work with the cumulative arrival process from all the users.
Lemma 5.2. Fix a cumulative arrival process from all the users. Let W (t) be
the total work in the system at time t. Then W (t) is the same across all work-
conserving policies.
Proof. Let A(t) be the cumulative arrival process to the queueing system. The
1Non-preemptive policies are those in which the processing of a job is never interrupted once
it starts getting served. In this work, we will only consider non-preemptive policies.
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work in the system evolves according to the differential equation
W˙ (t) = A˙(t)− IW (t)>0, (5.1)
which is the same for all work-conserving policies. Also, the initial condition
W (0) = 0 is the same across all scheduling policies. Hence W (t) is the same for
all work-conserving scheduling policies.
Because all jobs in the system are of the same size 1, the total number of jobs in
the system at any time t is just dW (t)e, which is the same across all the policies.
Therefore, the time average number of jobs in the system, for each fixed arrival
process is the same across all scheduling policies, and as a consequence of Little’s
law, the mean delay experienced by a job is also the same.
In addition, the delay offered by a policy that allows idling is strictly larger
than the delay offered by a work-conserving policy. Work-conserving policies
are equivalent to the class of delay-optimal scheduling policies. They also hap-
pen to be throughput optimal. It is therefore desirable to find within this class a
scheduling policy which also scores high on the privacy metric—perhaps a ran-
domized policy which makes use of a private source of randomness to obfuscate
the attacker.
FCFS, round-robin and longest-queue-first policies are a few examples of poli-
cies that do not idle. Note that a good attack strategy for one policy is not guar-
anteed to work for another. For instance, the attack against the FCFS policy de-
scribed in Section 4.3 does not work against the round-robin policy. That attack
relied on the fact that for FCFS, the inter-departure time between two consecu-
tive jobs from Bob was directly proportional to the number of arrivals from Alice
between these two jobs. This property is absent in round-robin; in fact, the inter-
departure time can depend on job arrivals before the first of the two jobs and
arrivals after the arrival of the second of the two jobs. Analyzing the performance
of each of these policies individually is not possible.
The approach taken in this work is that we bound the privacy performance of
the entire class of work-conserving policies. This section is devoted to deriving
such a bound. We do so by showing that if the scheduler were allowed to pick any
work-conserving policy that served jobs from both Alice and the attacker, Bob, the
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best strategy for it is to pick the policy that gives priority to jobs from the attacker.
Therefore, analyzing the performance of the priority policy serves as a bound on
the performance of any other work-conserving scheduling policy. Although this
policy is not implementable, because the scheduler would not know the identity
of the attacker, analyzing the privacy performance of this fictitious policy gives a
bound on the privacy performance of all work-conserving policies. Note that from
a privacy perspective, if the scheduler knew the identity of the attacker, the best
strategy (from a privacy perspective) would be for it to reject all of Bob’s jobs.
However, such a policy would not fall under the class of work-conserving policies
which are the focus of this section.
Theorem 5.3. A scheduling policy that gives priority to jobs from the attacker is
a privacy optimal scheduling policy within the class of work-conserving policies.
That is, if WC is the class of all work-conserving policies, and Ec,λ2Priority is the
privacy metric of the policy that gives priority to jobs from the attacker, then
Ec,λ2P ≤ Ec,λ2Priority, ∀P ∈ WC. (5.2)
The following lemma is used to prove the theorem.
Lemma 5.4. Fix an arrival process from Alice. Denote by tn1 the arrival times of
jobs from the attacker and let sn1 be the sizes of these jobs. Let t
′n
1 be the departure
times of these jobs if the scheduler gave priority to jobs of the attacker. For the
same set of arrivals from Alice and the attacker, let t˜n1 be the departure times of
the jobs of the attacker if the scheduler used a policy P,P ∈ WC. Then, t′i, for
each i is a deterministic function of tn1 , s
n
1 and t˜
n
1 .
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Let W (u) be the total work in the system at time u. As
stated in Theorem 5.1, W (u) is the same for all work-conserving policies. Denote
by W˜A(u), and W˜B(u) respectively, the total work of Alice and Bob in the system
at time u when the scheduler uses policy P. Then W (u) = W˜A(u) + W˜B(u).
Denote by 〈x〉 the fractional part of a real number x, i.e., 〈x〉 .= x− bxc.
Proposition 5.5. The attacker can compute 〈W (ti)〉 for each i.
Proof of proposition 5.5: When the scheduler uses policy P, suppose there are
m outstanding jobs from the attacker that have not departed by time ti. Let
j1, j2, . . . , jm be their indices, i.e., job j1 is the job from attacker that has ar-
rived by time ti and departs first after time ti, j2 is the second job that departs
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after time ti and so on. Suppose t˜j1 − ti ≤ sj1 , then at time ti, the scheduler
should have been busy serving a job from the attacker. In this case, W˜A(u) is an
integer. Therefore, 〈W (ti)〉 = 〈W˜B(ti)〉 = 〈t˜j1 − ti +
m∑
k=2
sjk〉. Now, suppose
t˜j1 − ti > sj1 , then at time ti, the scheduler should have been busy serving a job
from Alice. In this case, the scheduler has to first serve the job from Alice that is
in service at time ti and only then can it move on to serving other jobs. Therefore,
job j1 from the attacker can only depart at time 〈W˜A(ti)〉 + q, for some non-
negative integer q. Therefore, 〈W˜A(ti)〉 = 〈t˜j1 − sj1 − ti〉, and W˜B(ti) =
m∑
k=1
sjk .
Now, 〈W (ti)〉 = 〈〈W˜A(ti)〉 + 〈W˜B(ti)〉〉, which can clearly be computed by the
attacker.
To prove the result of the lemma, note that ∀ i,
t
′
i+1 =

ti+1 + 〈W (ti+1)〉+ si+1, if ti+1 > t′i
(5.3)
t
′
i + si+1, if ti+1 ≤ t′i .
(5.4)
If t′i < ti+1, then the i + 1
st job waits only for the service of the job that is
already at the server, and then immediately goes into service. Therefore equation
(5.3) follows. If t′i > ti+1, the i + 1
th job from the attacker goes into service
as soon as the ith job of the attacker gets served. Therefore (5.4) follows. Also,
t
′
1 = t1 + 〈W (t1)〉 + s1. From Proposition 5.5, 〈W (ti)〉 can be computed by the
attacker for each i, and consequently t′n1 .
Proof of Theorem 5.3. From Lemma 5.4, for any work-conserving policy P used
by the scheduler, the attacker, Bob, can always simulate the observations which
he would make if the scheduling policy were a priority policy. Denote by Ec,λ2Priority
the estimation error incurred by the strongest attacker against the priority policy.
Using the same notation from Lemma 5.4, for every P ∈ WC, we then have the
following:
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t˜n1 ]
)2]
= E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t˜n1 , t
′n
1 ]
)2]
(5.5)
≤ E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t
′n
1 ]
)2]
, (5.6)
27
where, (5.5) follows from Lemma 5.4, and (5.6) follows from an elementary re-
sult from estimation theory which states that discarding information leads to an
inferior estimate. Therefore,
min
tn1 ,s
n
1 :
n∑
j=1
sj
Nc
<1−λ2
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t˜n1 ]
)2]
≤ min
tn1 ,s
n
1 :
n∑
j=1
sj
Nc
<1−λ2
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t
′n
1 ]
)2]
,
and consequently, Ec,λP ≤ Ec,λ2Priority, ∀P ∈ WC.
5.1 An Attack against the Priority Policy
Ec,λ2Priority is the estimation error incurred by the attacker, Bob, when he launches the
best attack against the priority policy. In this section, we will state one specific
attack strategy which is not necessarily the best one. The resulting estimation
error, termed Ec,upper,Priority , will therefore be an upper bound to Ec,λ2Priority.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that at time 0 the system is com-
pletely empty, i.e., there are no outstanding jobs from any of the users. At time
0, the attacker issues a job. From then on, he injects a new job 1 − ζ time units
after the completion of his previous job, where ζ ∈ (0, 1), the choice of ζ does
not affect any of the results discussed below. Formally, let t1, t2, . . . be the times
when the attacker injects jobs into the system, and let t′1, t
′
2, . . . be their departure
times. Then, t1 = 0, and
tk+1 = t
′
k + 1− ζ, k = 1, 2, . . . . (5.7)
The size of all jobs is , a parameter which will be specified later.
Lemma 5.6. At the rate the attacker issues his jobs, the system can be shown to
be stable when Alice’s arrival rate is less than 1/(1 + ) (which is approximately
1−  for small ).
Proof. Note that in this attack, the attacker issues a new job only after the comple-
tion of service of all his earlier jobs. Therefore, at any time, there is atmost one job
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from the attacker in the system. The system is therefore stable as long as the num-
ber of unserved jobs from Alice does not blow up to infinity. Define Xn to be the
number of unserved jobs from Alice when the nth job from the attacker departs the
system. Consider the case whenXn > 0. Then, after the departure of the job from
the attacker, a job from Alice goes into service. It departs one time unit later, fol-
lowing which a job from the attacker departs. Then,Xn+1 = Xn−1+An+1, where
An+1 is the number of arrivals from Alice in between the departure times of the
nth and n+1th departures from the attacker. In this case,An+1 is a Poisson random
variable with mean λ(1 + ). Define the Lyapunov function V (X) = X2. Then,
forX > 0,E[V (Xn+1)−V (Xn)|Xn = X] = E[(An+1−1)2]+2YE[(An+1−1)].
From the Foster-Lyapunov stability theorem, if E[An+1] = λ(1 + ) < 1, the sys-
tem is stable.
5.1.1 Analysis of the Estimation Error Incurred by the Attacker
Note that, for some job k, if t′k − tk = , i.e., if the kth job goes into service
immediately after it is issued, then it must be the case that the system was empty
when the job was issued, at time tk. A busy period of the scheduling system
is an interval when the processor is busy serving jobs of either of the users. The
following lemma states that, through this attack, Bob learns the start and end times
of all the busy periods. Define rL1
.
= {r1, r2, . . . , rL} to be the start times of the
busy periods until time Nc, and let r′L1
.
= {r′1, r′2, . . . , r′L} be the end times of
these periods.
Lemma 5.7. The start and end times of the busy periods can be computed by
the attacker. Formally, rL1 and r
′L
1 are deterministic functions of the arrival and
departure times, tn1 , and t
′n
1 .
Proof. For some j, if t′j = tj + , i.e., if the j
th job from the attacker, Bob, goes
into service immediately upon its arrival, then the system must be empty at time
tj . Hence, tj marks the start of a busy period that is initiated by an attacker’s job.
On the other hand, if t′j > tj+, and t
′
j−1 < t
′
j−1−, then, t′j−1−marks the start
of a busy period that is initiated by a job from Alice. Because every busy period is
initiated by either a job from Alice or the attacker, and because the events that are
described above occur only at the start of busy periods, the start times of all the
busy periods can be computed by the attacker, and he can furthermore figure out
if these busy periods are initiated by an attacker’s job or Alice’s job. To compute
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the end times of the busy periods, note that the maximum time the scheduler stays
idle between two consecutive busy periods is less than 1. This is a consequence of
the arrival process from the attacker. Furthermore, note that all the busy periods
end with the departure of a job from the attacker irrespective of whether it was
initiated by a job from Alice or the attacker. Therefore, the last departure before
the start of the next busy period marks the end of the current busy period.
Lemma 5.8. Given the end times of the busy periods, the arrival and departure
times of the attacker’s jobs can be computed. Formally, tn1 and t
′n
1 are a determin-
istic function of r
′L
1 .
Proof. Recall that all of the busy periods end with the service of a job from the
attacker, and in each busy period, jobs from the attacker and Alice are served alter-
nately. Hence, all the busy periods that are initiated by a job from the attacker are
of duration (k+1)+k, for some non-negative integer k. Furthermore, preceding
the busy period initiated by the attacker’s job, there is no arrival from either of the
users for a duration of 1 time unit. On the other hand, all busy periods initiated
by a job from Alice are of duration (k + 1) + k + 1, for some non-negative in-
teger k. Preceding such a busy period is a period of duration less than 1 where
there are no arrivals from either of the users. Therefore, given the end times of
the busy period, the attacker can infer the duration of the busy period and also if
the busy period was initiated by an attacker’s job or Alice’s job. Therefore, if the
lth busy period was initiated by an attacker’s job, departures in that busy period
occur at times rl + , rl + 1 + 2, . . . , r
′
l . If the l
th busy period was instead ini-
tiated by a job from Alice, then the departures in that busy period occur at times
rl+1+, rl+2+2, . . . , r
′
l . Therefore, the departure times of all of attacker’s jobs
can be computed knowing the start and end times of the busy periods. Also, be-
cause the arrival and departure times of the jobs issued by the attacker are related
by (5.7), the arrival times of the jobs can be computed as well.
As a consequence of Lemmas 5.7 and 5.8, we have
E[Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 ] = E[Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , r
′L
1 ] = E[Xk|r
′L
1 ].
Therefore, the estimation error incurred by the attacker is the estimation error in-
curred in estimating the arrival pattern knowing the end times of the busy periods.
Notice that the results of Lemmas 5.7 and 5.8 hold true for all values of , the size
of jobs issued by the attacker.
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Denote by Ec,upper,Priority the resulting estimation error incurred by the attacker, i.e.,
Ec,upper,Priority .= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E
[
Xk|r′L1
])2]
. (5.8)
We will defer the computation of the best estimate, E[Xk|r′L1 ], and the resulting
estimation error, Ec,upper,Priority , to Section 5.3. Since Ec,λ2Priority is the smallest error Bob
can incur among all the attacks that he can possibly launch, and Ec,upper,Priority is the
error incurred by launching one specific attack, we have Ec,upper,Priority ≥ Ec,λ2Priority,
∀λ ≤ 1− . Also, as a consequence of (5.2), Ec,upper,Priority ≥ Ec,λP , ∀P ∈ WC, ∀λ ≤
1 − . In particular, Ec,upper,Priority bounds the privacy performance of the round-robin
policy. In the following section, we will provide a lower bound on the estimation
error incurred by any attacker against the round-robin scheduling policy, denoted
by Ec,lowerRR . Therefore, the following set of inequalities hold true:
Ec,upper,Priority ≥ Ec,λ2Priority ≥ Ec,λ2RR ≥ Ec,lowerRR , ∀λ ≤ 1− . (5.9)
In Section 5.4, it will be argued that lim
→0
Ec,upper,Priority = Ec,lowerRR , thus proving that
the bound computed on Ec,λ2Priority in this section is tight. And more importantly,
that round-robin is a privacy optimal scheduling policy within the class of work-
conserving policies.
5.2 Privacy Performance of the Round-Robin Policy
The round-robin scheduling policy serves jobs from multiple users as follows.
Suppose there are m users issuing jobs to the scheduler, indexed 1 through m.
After completion of a job issued by user i, the scheduler works on a job from
user i + 1, if present. If there are no jobs from user i + 1, the scheduler works
on a job from user i + 2, and so on. This is known to be a “fair” policy [63],
and because it is non-idling, it is also throughput-optimal. In this section, we will
show that it is also optimal with respect to the privacy metric within the class of
work-conserving policies. We start by constructing a lower bound to Ec,λ2RR , the
estimation error incurred by the strongest attacker against the round-robin policy.
We do so by providing the attacker with a side information. Without this extra
information, the attacker can only be worse off in his estimation.
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Figure 5.1: The cumulative arrivals, AA(u), and departures, D1A(u), as a function
of time u. The upward pointing arrows denote the arrival times of jobs from
Alice, and the gray regions signify the busy periods of this scheduler.
5.2.1 A Lower Bound on the Ec,λ2RR
Consider a round-robin scheduler where Alice is the only user of the system. The
times when she issues her jobs are given by the cumulative arrival processAA(u),
where u indexes time. Let D1A(u) denote the total amount of service received
by Alice until time u in this system. Let AA and D1A represent the functions
AA(u),∀u and D1A(u),∀u respectively. AA is a counting function, and D1A is a
non-decreasing function with a slope either 0 or 1 (the function is differentiable
almost everywhere); see Figure 5.1. If the slope is 1 at a time u, the processor is
busy serving a job then. If the slope is 0, then the processor has finished serving
all the jobs issued by Alice until then (scheduler never idles). Note thatD1A ≤ AA,
and consequently, D1A(u) is a lower bound on the total number of jobs that have
arrived from Alice until time u. Now, consider a round-robin scheduler that is
used both by Alice and Bob, as shown in Figure 5.2. Suppose Alice’s arrivals are
the same as in the earlier system. Let tn1 be the times when Bob issues his jobs, s
n
1
be their sizes, and t′n1 be their departure times. Denote by D2A(u) the total service
received by Alice until time u in this system. Having chosen his arrival times
and sizes, and having observed their departure times, Bob has to estimate the total
number of arrivals from Alice in a clock period k. We will consider the scenario
where the attacker is given D1A as side information as shown in Figure 5.2. We
will show that the resulting estimation error for this attacker is a lower bound on
Ec,λ2RR .
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Figure 5.2: Pictorial representation of the computation of Ec,lowerRR , a lower bound
on Ec,λ2RR . Apart from the information available to him through his attack, the
attacker, Bob, is also given side information (shown in dotted arrow) which is the
departures if Alice was the only user of the scheduling system.
Theorem 5.9. The estimate E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t′n1 ] is an inferior estimate compared to
E[Xk|D1A]. Therefore, if the attacker, Bob, is given the side information, function
D1A, his own arrival and departure times provide him no further information about
Alice’s arrival pattern, and consequently can be discarded.
We first prove the following two lemmas which form the basis of the proof.
Lemma 5.10. The departure times of jobs issued by the attacker, t′n1 , are a function
of their arrival times, tn1 , their sizes s
n
1 , and D1A.
Proof. We will use induction to prove this lemma. First, note thatD2A(u) = D1A(u)
∀u ∈ (0, t1). This is because the two systems have the same arrivals until then.
At time t1, the scheduler is either busy serving a job from Alice, or is idle. If it is
busy, then the scheduler waits until it completes the service of this job, and then
switches over to serve Bob. In either case, Bob’s incoming job goes into service at
time t˜1 = inf{u > t1 : D1A(u) = dD1A(t1)e}, and the job departs the system at time
t
′
1 = t˜1+ s1. Therefore, D2A(u) = D1A(u),∀u ∈ (0, t˜1) and because Alice does not
get any service when the scheduler serves Bob, D2A(u) = D1A(t˜1),∀u ∈ (t˜1, t′1).
Statement of the induction: Given arrival times of the first k jobs from Bob,
tk1, their sizes s
k
1, departure times of the first k − 1 of his jobs, t
′(k−1)
1 , D1A, and
D2A(u),∀u ∈ (0, t′k−1), the departure time of the kth job, t′k, and D2A(u),∀u ∈
(0, t
′
k) can be computed.
Proof of induction: The base case for induction is already proved. We need to
prove it for some k > 1 assuming it is true for all times before that. The arrival
time of the kth job from Bob falls into one of the following cases:
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Case 1: tk < t
′
k−1. Note thatD2A(u) ≤ D1A(u),∀u. This is because in the second
system, there are jobs from the attacker along with the jobs from Alice. Also,
D˙2A(t
′−
k−1) = 0, where t
′−
k−1 is an infinitesimal small time before t
′
k−1. Therefore, if
D2A(t′k−1) = D1A(t′k−1), then it must be the case that D˙1A(t′k−1) = 0, implying that
all of Alice’s jobs that arrived before t′k−1 have been served by then. Therefore,
the kth job from Bob goes into service immediately and departs the system at time
t
′
k = t
′
k−1 + sk. In this case, D2A(u) = D2A(t′k−1)∀u ∈ (t′k−1, t′k).
If D2A(t′k−1) < D1A(t′k−1), at time t′k−1, there is at least one unserved job from
Alice in the system, which goes into service at time t′k−1. Therefore, D2A(u) =
D2A(t′k−1)+u− t′k−1,∀u ∈ (t′k−1, t′k−1+1), andD2A(u) = D2A(t′k−1),∀u ∈ (t′k−1+
1, t
′
k−1 + 1 + sk). In this case t
′
k = t
′
k−1 + 1 + sk.
Case 2: tk > t
′
k−1. In this case, after serving the k − 1th job from Bob, the
scheduler switches over to Alice and serves her jobs back to back (if there are
jobs to be served) until the kth job from Bob arrives. Therefore ∀u ∈ (t′k−1, tk),
D2A(u) = min{D2A(t
′
k−1) + u− t
′
k−1,D1A(u)}.
The time when the kth job from Bob goes into service is given by t˜k = inf{u >
tk : D2A(tk)+u− tk = dD2A(tk)e}. Then, D2A(u) = D2A(tk)+u− tk,∀u ∈ (tk, t˜k),
t
′
k = t˜k + sk, and D2A(u) = D2A(t˜k),∀u ∈ (t˜k, t′k).
Lemma 5.11. The arrival times tn2 are a function of t1, s1, and D1A. Also, t1 and
s1 are independent of D1A and Xk.
Proof. The available information to the attacker, Bob, when he issues his second
job is no more than the time when he issued his first job, its size, and its departure
time. Therefore, for any attack strategy, the time and the size of the second job can
depend at most on the time of arrival, departure and the size of the first job. By
the result of the Lemma 5.10, t′1 is a function of t1, s1 and D1A. Therefore, t2 and
s2 are functions of these variables as well. By a similar argument, t3 and s3 are
dependent at most on t1, t2, s1, s2, t
′
1 and t
′
2, all of which are just a function of t1, s1
and D1A, and so on. Before issuing his first job, the attacker has no information
about Alice’s arrivals. Hence t1 and s1 are independent of any function of the
arrival times of Alice’s jobs, in particular, Xk.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Note that the estimate E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t′n1 ,D1A] is a superior
estimate of Xk compared to E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t′n1 ] (the more information the attacker
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has, the more accurate his estimation of Alice’s traffic pattern). As a result of
Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11, E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t′n1 ,D1A] = E[Xk|t1, s1,D1A] = E[Xk|D1A].
As a consequence of Theorem 5.9, we have
∀{tn1 , sn1},E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|tn1 , sn1 , t
′n
1 ]
)2]
≥ E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|D1A]
)2]
, (5.10)
and therefore, Ec,λ2RR ≥ Ec,lowerRR , where
Ec,lowerRR .= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|D1A]
)2]
. (5.11)
5.3 Computation of the Best Estimate and the
Resulting Estimation Error
In this section, we present an algorithm to compute E[Xk|D1A] and Ec,lowerRR numer-
ically. We do so by specifying an equivalence between the estimation problem,
and an equivalent combinatorial path counting problem.
Recall that Ec,lowerRR is the estimation error incurred by an attacker who is given
the departure process of a scheduler used only by Alice. Note that this additional
side information is equivalent to providing the attacker with the start and end times
of the busy periods of a scheduler used only by Alice. This is because all jobs of
Alice are of a fixed unit size, so the departures are a deterministic function of the
start and end times of the busy periods. The busy periods are represented as gray
blocks in Figure 5.1.
We start by considering a slightly different problem of constructing the best
estimate of the number of arrivals within a busy period. Formally, suppose a busy
period of duration B + 1 is initiated at time 0, where B is some non-negative
integer. Suppose the attacker, Bob, observes that the processor is busy from time
0 to time B + 1, and he knows that there is only one user issuing jobs to the
system. He wishes to estimate the number of arrivals between times (u1, u2),
where 0 ≤ u1 < u2 ≤ B + 1. The job that initiates the busy period arrives at
time u0 = 0. Let u1, u2, . . . , uB, uB+1 be the arrival times of the next B + 1 jobs.
Then, in order to sustain the busy period of duration B + 1, the arrival times of
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Figure 5.3: Two counting functions that lead to a busy period of duration 5.
these jobs should satisfy u1 < 1, u2 < 2, . . . , uB < B and uB+1 > B + 1. This is
because the job from Alice that arrived at time zero goes into service immediately
and departs at time one. Therefore, in order for the busy period to be sustained
beyond time one, there must be at least one more arrival by then. By a similar
argument, the second job has to arrive before time two, and so on. Finally, for the
busy period to end, we need uB+1 > B+1. Figure 5.3 shows two possible arrival
patterns (shown as counting functions) that could lead to a busy period of duration
5. In fact, any counting function that lies in the region that is not shaded leads to
a busy period of duration 5.
Let {Ns}s≥0 be a Poisson process of rate λ. For a positive integer t, and non-
negative integers i, j, j ≥ i, define
δi,j(t) = Pr(Nt = j + 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t− 1}|N0 = i+ 1),
which is the probability that a Poisson counting function of rate λ jumps to state
j + 1 by time t given that it starts at state i + 1 at time 0 while staying above
the boundary Ns = s + 1, s = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. In particular, δ0,B(B + 1) is the
probability that a job that arrives at time t = 0 leads to a busy period of duration
B + 1. Now consider the following expression:
ζ(i, t, B)
.
=
Pr(Nt = i+ 1|N0 = 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}, NB+1 = B + 1).
(5.12)
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In this case, ζ(i, t, B) gives the probability that there are i arrivals in the period
(0, t) given that a busy period that started at time 0 ended at time B + 1. This
conditional probability is related to δi,j(t) as follows:
ζ(i, t, B)
=
Pr(Nt = i+ 1, N0 = 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}, NB+1 = B + 1)
Pr(N0 = 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}, NB+1 = B + 1)
= Pr(Nt = i+ 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t− 1}|N0 = 1)×
Pr(NB = B + 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , B − 1}|Nt = i+ 1)
Pr(N0 = 1, Ns ≥ s+ 1, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}, NB+1 = B + 1) ×
Pr(NB+1 = B + 1|NB = B + 1) (5.13)
=
δ0,i(t)δi−t,B−t(B − t)δ0,0(1)
B∑
i=t
δ0,i(t)δi−t,B−t(B − t)δ0,0(1)
=
δ0,i(t)δi−t,B−t(B − t)
B∑
i=t
δ0,i(t)δi−t,B−t(B − t)
. (5.14)
The expected number of arrivals by time t within a busy period of duration
B + 1 is given by
µB+1(t) = 1 +
B∑
i=t
iζ(i, t, B), (5.15)
where the 1 counts the arrival at time 0 that initiated the busy period. Likewise,
if one were to estimate the number of arrivals by time t to be µB+1(t), the mean
error incurred would be
νB+1(t) =
B∑
i=t
(i+ 1− µB+1(t))2ζ(i, t, B). (5.16)
Also, the expected number of arrivals between time t andB+1 of a busy period
of duration B + 1 is B + 1− µB+1(t), and the mean error incurred if one were to
estimate the number of arrivals in this time by the mean is νB+1(t).
Computation of δi,j(t) is necessary in order to compute the best estimates and
the resulting error. However, deriving a closed-form expression for δi,j(t) is not
easy except in some special cases. We transform the problem of computing δi,j(t)
to a combinatoric path counting problem which admits a numerical solution. Be-
fore doing so, we state the following theorem which gives an equivalence between
a Poisson counting process, and a geometric approximation to it which is used
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later.
Lemma 5.12. Let {Y ni }i=0,1,2,... be a sequence of i.i.d. Geometric random vari-
ables indexed by integer n, with Pr(Y ni = k) = p
k(1−p), k = 0, 1, 2, . . ..2 Define
N˜ns =
bsnc∑
i=0
Y ni . Let p scale with n such that np = λ, where λ is a constant. As
defined earlier, let Ns be a Poisson process of rate λ. Then, for any finite integer
k, and any 0 < t1 < t2 < . . . < tk, the joint distribution of N˜nt1 , N˜
n
t2
, . . . , N˜ntk
converges to the joint distribution of Nt1 , Nt2 , . . . , Ntk as n→∞.
Proof. Refer to Section 2.2.5, and in particular Theorem 2.2.4 and Corollary
2.2.1, of [64]. The reference gives a Bernoulli approximation of a Poisson process.
The proof for the geometric random variable is very similar.
The sum of i.i.d. geometrically distributed random variables is a negative bino-
mial random variable [65]. Let {Yi}i=0,1,2,... be a sequence of i.i.d. geometrically
distributed random variables with parameter λ
n
, i.e., Pr(Yi = l) =
(
λ
n
)l (
1− λ
n
)
, l =
0, 1, 2, . . .. Define N˜ns
.
=
bnsc∑
i=1
Yi. Then
Pr(N˜ns = l) =
(
l + bnsc − 1
l
)(
1− λ
n
)bnsc(
λ
n
)
=
(
ns
(
l
ns
+ bnsc
ns
− 1
ns
))l
+ o(nl)
l!nl
((
1− λ
n
)ns) bnscns
λl.
(5.17)
lim
n→∞
Pr(N˜ns = l) =
e−λs(λs)l
l!
. (5.18)
2Y ni is not to be mistaken for a vector Yi, Yi+1, . . . , Yn. Also, n here does not index time.
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For any finite integer k, and any 0 < t1 < t2 < . . . < tk,
Pr(N˜nt1 = l1, N˜
n
t2
= l2, . . . , N˜
n
tk
= lk) = Pr(N˜
n
t1
= l1)×
k∏
j=2
Pr(N˜ntj − N˜ntj−1 = lj − lj−1)
=Pr
bnt1c∑
i=1
Yi = l1
 k∏
j=2
Pr
 bntjc∑
i=bntj−1c
Yi = lj − lj−1
 .
lim
n→∞
Pr(N˜nt1 = l1, N˜
n
t2
= l2, . . . , N˜
n
tk
= lk) =
e−λt1(λt1)l1
l1!
×
k∏
j=2
e−λ(tj−tj−1) (λ(tj − tj−1))lj−lj−1
(lj − lj−1)! (5.19)
=Pr(Nt1 = l1)
k∏
j=2
Pr(Ntj −Ntj−1 = lj − lj−1)
=Pr(Nt1 = l1, Nt2 = l2, . . . , Ntk = lk), (5.20)
where (5.19) follows from (5.18) and (5.20) follows from the independent incre-
ments property of the Poisson process [65].
Lemma 5.12 states the following. Suppose a particle moves on a lattice, moving
right a distance of 1
n
and moving up a distance of k with probability (λ
n
)k(1− λ
n
),
k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Then, the path of such a particle follows a Poisson process of rate
λ in the limit n → ∞. In Figure 5.4 we plot the sample path of a particle that
moves in this fashion.
The equivalence between computation of δi,j(t) and a combinatoric counting
problem is given in the following:
δi,j(t) = Pr(Nt = j|N0 = i)Pr(Nt = j,Ns ≥ s, s = 1, . . . , t− 1|N0 = i)
Pr(Nt = j|N0 = i)
= e−λt
(λt)j−i
(j − i)! limn→∞
Pr(N˜nt = j, N˜
n
s ≥ s, s = 1, . . . , t− 1|N˜n0 = i)
Pr(N˜nt = j|N˜n0 = i)
(5.21)
= e−λt
(λt)j−i
(j − i)! limn→∞
#Paths(0, i)→ (nt, j) avoiding the boundary
#Paths(0, i)→ (nt, j) ,
(5.22)
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Figure 5.4: Sample path of a particle that moves according to the geometric
process. From Lemma 5.12, δ1,7(5) can be computed by counting the total
number of paths from (0, 1) to (5n, 7), and those that do not touch the shaded
region and taking the appropriate ratio, in the limit n→∞. In the figure n is 8.
where (5.21) follows from the results of Lemma 5.12. The denominator of the
fraction on the right side of the equality in (5.21) is the probability that a par-
ticle starting at the point (0, i) and moving according to the geometric process
described before hits the point (nt, j). The numerator is the probability that a
particle starting at (0, i) hits the point (tn, j) while staying above the boundary
{(a, b) : b = d a
n
e − 1}. Note that for this geometric process, there is a finite
number of paths between the two points. In all these paths that originate at (0, i)
and terminate at (tn, j), the particle “moves right and up” j − i times and “moves
right without jumping” nt − (j − i) times. Therefore, the probability of the par-
ticle taking any of these paths is the same, equal to (λ
n
)j−i(1 − λ
n
)nt. Therefore
the ratio of the two probabilities is just equal to the ratio of the number of lattice
paths on a grid that avoid a boundary to the total number of lattice paths between
the aforementioned points. Equation (5.22) follows, where the boundary is the set
of integer points (a, b) which satisfy {b = d a
n
e − 1}. In Figure 5.4, the red line
corresponds to the boundary.
The significance of Lemma 5.12 is that, for any finite n, the number of lat-
tice paths can be counted. The denominator in (5.22) is given by
(
nt+j−i
j−i
)
=
tj−i
(j−i)!n
j−i + o(nj−i), where lim
n→∞
o(nj−i)/nj−i = 0. This is because a particle
starting at (0, i) has to take nt up-steps and j− i right-steps in order to reach point
(nt, j), and these steps can be taken in any order. There is no closed-form ex-
pression for the numerator in (5.22) though. Counting the number of lattice paths
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Figure 5.5: In the vector notation, the red path is denoted by (2, 5, 6) and the blue
path is denoted by (1, 2, 4). The blue path is dominated by the red path.
between two points on a grid while avoiding a boundary is an extensively studied
combinatorial problem with several applications (refer to [66]). Using Lemma
5.13, we can show that the numerator in (5.22) is given by γ(i, j, t)nj−i+o(nj−i),
and the value of γ(i, j, t) can be numerically computed.
Lemma 5.13 (Lemma 3A of Chapter 1 in [66]). The number of paths dominated
by the path p with vector (a1, a2, . . . , an) can be recursively calculated as Vn
using the recursion formula
Vk =
k∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
(
ak−j+1 + 1
j
)
Vk−j, V0 = 1. (5.23)
The definitions of the vector representation of a path and of path domination are
the following. A lattice path from the origin (0, 0) to a point (m,n) is associated
with a path (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where xi is the minimal horizontal distance of the
point (m,n− i) from the path. A path (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is said to dominate a path
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) if yi ≤ xi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. See Figure 5.5 for an example.
The number of lattice paths from (0, i) to (nt, j) staying above the specified
boundary is equal to the number of lattice paths from the origin to (nt, j − i)
dominated by a path with vector (a1 = n(i + 1), a2 = n(i + 2), . . . , at−i−1 =
n(t − 1), at−i = nt, at−i+1 = nt, . . . , aj−i = nt). Using this fact, the ratio in
(5.22), γ(i, j, t)(j− i)!/tj−i, and consequently δi,j(t) can be evaluated exactly, for
any integers i, j, t. The expected number of arrivals by time t is given in (5.15),
and the mean error incurred if one estimates the number of arrivals by time t
using the mean is given by (5.16). These can be computed as well. A suitably
modified definition of δi,j(t) for non-integer values of t can be expressed in terms
of δi,j(btc) and δi,j(dte), and can be computed. Likewise with the mean number
of arrivals and the mean estimation error, they can be computed as well.
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kc− r˜′
l˜k
−(kc− r˜′m˜k)
0 1 2 3 4
Clock period k
Figure 5.6: Pk, The clock period k is said to be “covered” by busy periods 0, 1, 2
and 3. The clock period k + 1 is covered by busy periods 2, 3 and 4.
Now, going back to the evaluation of Ec,lowerRR , let r˜L1 and r˜
′L
1 denote the start
and end times of busy periods of a system in which Alice is the only user. Note
that providing the attacker, Bob, with the side information D1A is equivalent to
providing him with the start and end times of the busy periods. Suppose l˜k =
argmaxj{r˜′j < (k − 1)c} is the last busy period that ended before the start of
clock period k, and m˜k = argminj{r˜′j ≥ kc} is the first busy period that ended
after the end of the clock period k. Define P˜k to be the set {kc−r˜′l˜k , kc−r˜l˜k+1, kc−
r˜
′
l˜k+1
, kc− r˜l˜k+2, kc− r˜
′
l˜k+2
, . . . , kc− r˜m˜k , kc− r˜′m˜k}. P˜k is the set containing the
start and end times of the busy periods and the preceding idle periods (relative to
the end time of the clock period, and excluding the start of the busy period l˜k) that
“cover” the clock period k. This information contained in this set is a sufficient
statistic to estimate Xk.
Lemma 5.14. {(Xk, P˜k)}k=1,2,... is a Markov chain. Also,E[Xk|D1A] = E[Xk|P˜k].
Proof. As a result of Alice’s arrival process being memoryless, the durations
of successive busy periods are independent. Therefore, the process {P˜i}i=1,2,...,
which contains the start and end times of busy periods that cover successive clock
periods, is a Markov chain. Also, conditioned on P˜k, then number of arrivals in
clock period k, Xk, is independent of P˜i,∀i 6= k.
Corollary 5.15. The long-run estimation error incurred by an attacker as given
by expression (5.11) can equivalently be computed as the statistical average
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|D1A]
)2]
= E
[
(Xk − E[Xk|P˜k])2
]
, (5.24)
where in the expression on the right, the expectation is taken with respect to the
steady-state distribution of the pair (Xk, P˜k).
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Proof. The result follows from the ergodic theorem for Markov chains. Refer to
Theorem 1.10.2 of [67]. A technical requirement for the theorem to hold true, and
which is satisfied in our case, is that E
[
(Xk − E[Xk|D1A])2
]
is bounded above by
λc <∞.
Now define Fk = r˜
′
k − r˜′k−1, k = 2, 3, . . ., with F1 .= r˜′1. The random-variables
{Fk}k≥2 are independent and identically distributed random variables, and conse-
quently, the end times of the busy periods form a renewal process. Using this fact,
Blackwell’s celebrated renewal theorem can be used to compute the distribution
of P˜k as follows:
fr˜′
l˜k
,r˜l˜k+1
,r˜
′
l˜k+1
,r˜l˜k+2
,r˜
′
l˜k+2
,...,r˜m˜k ,r˜
′
m˜k
(β0, α1, β1, α2, β2, . . . , αm˜k−l˜k , βm˜k−l˜k)
= fr˜′
l˜k
,r˜l˜k+1
,r˜
′
l˜k+1
(β0, α1, β1)×
m˜k−l˜k∏
j=2
fr˜l˜j ,r˜
′
l˜j
|r˜′
l˜k
,r˜l˜k+1
,r˜
′
l˜k+1
,...,r˜l˜j−1,r˜
′
l˜j−1
(αj, βj|β0, α1, β1, . . . , αj−1, βj−1)
(5.25)
= fr˜′
l˜k
,r˜l˜k+1
,r˜
′
l˜k+1
(β0, α1, β1)
m˜k−l˜k∏
j=2
fr˜lj ,r˜
′
lj
|r˜′lj−1
(αj, βj|βj−1) (5.26)
=
(β1 − β0)λe−λ(α1−β0)δ0,β1−α1−1(β1 − α1)
∞∫
s=0
∞∑
B=0
(s+B + 1)λe−λsδ0,B(B + 1)ds
×
mk−lk∏
j=2
λe−λ(αj−βj−1)δ0,βj−αj−1(βj − αj), (5.27)
where (5.25) follows from the chain rule of joint distributions, (5.26) follows from
the fact that the Poisson arrivals from Alice are Markovian, and (5.27) follows
from the application of Blackwell’s theorem. Also recall that δ0,B(B + 1) is the
probability that a job arriving at time 0 leads to a busy period of duration B + 1.
Consider Figure 5.6. Busy periods zero, one, two and three cover the kth clock
period. Among these busy periods, it is only in busy periods one and three the
attacker does incur any error in estimating the total number of arrivals in between
times (k − 1)c and kc. This is because the attacker only knows the start and end
times of these busy periods, but not the times when the jobs arrived. For example,
in busy period one, out of the total three arrivals, the attacker is not sure if the
number of arrivals between times (k − 1)c and kc is zero, one or two. Likewise,
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in clock period k + 1, it is only in busy period three that the attacker does incur
any estimation error. Recall that µB+1(t) and νB+1(t) are respectively the best
estimate and the resulting estimation error of the number of arrivals in between
time (0, t) of a busy period that lasts for a duration of B + 1(> t) time units as
given in equations (5.15) and (5.16). Using these definitions, the best estimate and
the resulting error incurred in a general clock period can be expressed as follows.
For a given cover of the clock period, P˜k, the best estimate of the number of
arrivals within that clock period is
E[Xk|P˜k] = r˜′l˜k+1 − r˜l˜k+1 − µ
r˜
′
l˜k+1
−r˜l˜k+1 ((r˜l˜k+1 − (k − 1)c)+) +
m˜k−l˜k−1∑
j=2
(
r˜
′
l˜k+j
− r˜l˜k+j
)
+ µ
r˜
′
m˜k
−r˜m˜k ((kc− r˜m˜k)+), (5.28)
and the error incurred by using this best estimate is given by
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|P˜k]
)2]
= ν
r˜
′
l˜k+1
−r˜l˜k+1 ((r˜l˜k+1 − (k − 1)c)+) +
ν
r˜
′
m˜k
−r˜m˜k ((kc− r˜m˜k)+). (5.29)
As mentioned before, νB+1(t) can be computed numerically, and so can the
distribution of (Xk, P˜k). Next we prove that Ec,lowerRR computed here is exactly
equal to Ec,upper,Priority under certain limiting conditions. After proving their equiva-
lence, in Section 5.5 we provide a plot of the computed errors and discuss their
implications.
5.4 Equivalence of E c,lowerRR and E c,upper,Priority
In this section, we prove the following theorem which establishes that round-
robin is an optimal privacy preserving policy among the class of work-conserving
policies.
Theorem 5.16. In the limit as the size of jobs from the attacker, Bob, goes to zero,
the estimation error incurred by the attacker against the priority policy when he
issues jobs according to the strategy specified in Section 5.1 is equal to the lower
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bound on the privacy of the round-robin policy; i.e.,
lim
→0
Ec,upper,Priority = Ec,lowerRR . (5.30)
Ec,lowerRR is the estimation error incurred by the attacker, Bob, when he knows the
departure process of a system in which Alice is the only user. Note that the side
information D1A is equivalent to providing the attacker the start and end times of
the busy periods of a system in which Alice is the only user. This is because the
system is busy at time u if D1A(u) = 1, otherwise, it is idle.
Recall from Section 5.1 that Ec,upper,Priority is the estimation error incurred by the
attacker when he uses the start and end times of the busy periods of the scheduling
system which gives priority to jobs from the attacker. However, when the size
of jobs issued by the attacker, , is small, the busy periods of this system are
statistically identical to the busy periods of a system where Alice is the only user.
Recall that we use the notation rL1 and r
′L
1 to denote the start and end times of
the resulting busy periods when the attacker uses the attack specified in Section
5.1. Define lk = argmaxj{r′j < (k − 1)c} to be the last busy period that ended
before the start of clock period k, and mk = argminj{r′j ≥ kc} to be the first
busy period that ended after the end of the clock period k. Define Pk to be the set
{kc−r′lk , kc−rlk+1, kc−r
′
lk+1
, kc−rlk+2, kc−r′lk+2, . . . , kc−rmk , kc−r
′
mk
}. Pk
is the set containing the start and end times of the busy periods and the preceding
idle periods (relative to the end time of the clock period, and excluding the start
of the busy period lk) that cover the clock period k. This information contained in
this set is a sufficient statistic to estimate Xk.
Lemma 5.17. The pair {(Xk, Pk)}k=0,1,2,... form a Markov chain. As a result,
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − E[Xk|rL1 , r
′L
1 ]
)2]
= E
[
(Xk − E[Xk|Pk])2
]
. (5.31)
Proof. The proofs are similar to those of Lemma 5.14 and Corollary 5.15. Arrivals
from Alice are Poisson, which are memoryless. The arrival time of the next job
from Bob depends only on the departure of his last job, whose information is
contained in Pk.
Let BRR be a random variable denoting the length of a busy period of a schedul-
ing system used only by Alice, and which serves jobs using some work-conserving
policy. Note that for a scheduling system that is being used only by one user, the
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duration of the busy periods does not depend on which policy the system is us-
ing, as long as it is work-conserving. Also, since the arrivals from Alice follow
a Poisson process, the duration of successive busy periods are independent and
identically distributed. Also, let BPr, be a random variable denoting the length
of a busy period of a system that serves jobs from both Alice and the attacker,
Bob, but which gives non-pre-emptive priority to jobs from the attacker. A busy
period in such a system is one of two kinds, one that is initiated by a job from the
attacker, denoted by BPr,Bob and one that is initiated by a job from Alice, denoted
by BPr,Alice.
Lemma 5.18. In the limit as the size of jobs issued by the attacker goes to zero,
we have
lim
→0
BPr,Bob d= 0, (5.32)
lim
→0
BPr,Alice d= BRR, (5.33)
where d= implies equality in distribution.
Proof. First, consider a scheduling system that serves jobs only from Alice ac-
cording to some non-pre-emptive non-idling policy. When there is only one user
of the system, all such policies are equivalent, including round-robin. Let BRR be
the random variable denoting the length of a busy period of this system.
Lemma 5.19. The moment generating function (MGF) of BRR which is defined
asMRR(t) .= E[ejtBRR ], satisfiesMRR(t) = ejteλ(MRR(t)−1).
Proof. Suppose a job from Alice arrives to an idle system at time 0. This job
departs the system at time 1. In this time, suppose there are ν other jobs that
arrive. Modeling a busy period as a branching process as shown in proposition
6-2 of [68], we have,
BRR d= 1 + BRR1 + BRR2 + . . .+ BRRν , (5.34)
where, BRRi is the duration of a busy period that is initiated by the ith job from
Alice. The MGF of BRR should satisfy the equationMRR(t) = ejte−λ(MRR(t)−1).
Now consider a scheduling system that serves jobs from both Alice and the
attacker, giving non-pre-emptive priority to jobs from the attacker. Recall that the
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attacker issues a new job 1 − ζ time units after the departure of his previous job.
Also, the time it takes to serve a job from Alice is 1, which is greater than 1 − ζ .
Therefore, all the busy periods of this system end with a departure of a job from
the attacker. Suppose that a busy period has ended at time 0. The next job from
the attacker arrives exactly 1-ζ time units later. If there is an arrival from Alice in
the meantime, a new busy period is initiated by that job, and lasts for a duration
of BPr,Alice units of time. Otherwise, at time 1-ζ , a new busy period is initiated by
the incoming job from the attacker which lasts for BPr,Bob units of time. BPr,Alice and
BPr,Bob denote busy periods initiated by a job from Alice and Bob respectively, with
supports {k + 1 + (k + 1)} and {k + (k + 1)}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Lemma 5.20. LetMPr,Alice(t) .= E[ejtB
Pr,
Alice ] andMPr,Bob (t) .= E[ejtB
Pr,
Bob ] denote the
moment generating functions of the busy periods initiated by a job from Alice and
Bob respectively. They are given by:
MPr,Bob (t) = ejteλ(M
Pr,
Alice(t)−1) (5.35)
MPr,Alice(t) = ejtMPr,Bob (t)eλ(M
Pr,
Alice(t)−1). (5.36)
Proof. Consider a busy period that is initiated by a job from the attacker. When
it is in service, which takes  amount of time, suppose νB number of Alice’s jobs
arrive. νB is a Poisson random variable with parameter λ. The distributions of
BPr,Bob and BPr,Alice are related by
BPr,Bob d= + BPr,Alice1 + BPr,Alice2 + . . .+ BPr,AliceνB , (5.37)
where BPr,Alicei is the duration of the busy period that is initiated by the ith job from
Alice. Now consider a busy period that is initiated by a job from Alice. When it
is in service, which takes 1 unit of time, suppose there are νA other arrivals from
Alice. νA is a Poisson random variable with parameter λ. There is also one, and
exactly one arrival from the attacker in this time. Therefore,
BPr,Alice d= 1 + BPr,Bob + BPr,Alice1 + BPr,Alice2 + . . .+ BPr,AliceνA . (5.38)
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From (5.37) and (5.38), we have
MPr,Bob (t) =
∞∑
k=0
e−λ(λ)k
k!
E
[
e
jt(+
k∑
i=1
BPr,Alicei)
]
= ejt
∞∑
k=0
e−λ(λ)k
k!
(MPr,Alice(t))k
= ejteλ(M
Pr,
Alice(t)−1) (5.39)
MPr,Alice(t) =
∞∑
k=0
e−λ(λ)k
k!
E
[
e
jt(1+BPr,Bob +
k∑
i=1
BPr,Alicei)
]
= ejtMPr,Bob (t)
∞∑
k=0
e−λ(λ)k
k!
(MPr,Alice(t))k
= ejtMPr,Bob (t)eλ(M
Pr,
Alice(t)−1). (5.40)
Define
F1(, t,MPr,Bob (t),MPr,Alice(t)) =MPr,Bob (t)− ejteλ(M
Pr,
Alice(t)−1) (5.41)
F2(, t,MPr,Bob (t),MPr,Alice(t)) =MPr,Alice(t)− ejtMPr,Bob (t)eλ(M
Pr,
Alice(t)−1). (5.42)
F1 = 0 and F2 = 0 give two implicit definitions of MPr,Alice(t) and MPr,Bob (t)
in terms of (, t). Next, we establish the continuity properties of MPr,Alice(t) and
MPr,Bob (t).
Theorem 5.21. The functionsMPr,Alice(t) andMPr,Bob (t) are continuous functions
of  and t, and in particular, lim
→0
MPr,Bob (t) = 1 and lim→0M
Pr,
Alice(t) =MRR(t).
Proof. Clearly, the functions F1 and F2 are continuous and differentiable func-
tions of the arguments. Consider the point
(, t,MPr,Bob (t),MPr,Alice(t)) = (0, t, 1,MRR(t)).
Note that
F1(0, t, 1,MRR(t)) = 1− 1 = 0, (5.43)
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and
F2(0, t, 1,MRR(t)) = MRR(t)− ejteλ(MRR(t)−1)
= 0, (5.44)
where (5.44) follows from Lemma 5.19.
In order to relate the continuity and differentiability of F1 and F2 to that of
MPr,Alice(t) andMPr,Bob (t), we make use of the implicit function theorem, given in
Theorem 1 of Section 8.5.4 of [69]. We evaluate the following Jacobian determi-
nant∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F1
∂MPr,Bob (t)
∂F1
∂MPr,Alice(t)
∂F2
∂MPr,Bob (t)
∂F2
∂MPr,Alice(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,t,1,MRR(t))
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 0−ejteλ(MRR(t)−1) 1− λejteλ(MRR(t)−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
The determinant is equal to 1− λMRR(t) 6= 0. By the implicit function theorem,
the functionsMPr,Bob (t) andMPr,Alice(t) are continuous and differentiable functions
of the arguments  and t. The result follows.
Therefore, in the limit when  goes to 0, a busy period initiated by an attacker’s
job has MGF of 1, and one initiated by a job from Alice lasts for a random dura-
tion whose MGF is given byMRR(t). By Le´vy’s continuity theorem, proved in
Theorem 18.1 of [70], point-wise convergence of MGFs implies convergence of
the corresponding CDFs. Therefore, lim
→0
BPr,Bob d= 0, and lim→0B
Pr,
Alice
d
= BRR.
Proof of Theorem 5.16. Recall that Lemma 5.17 establishes that the estimation
error depends only on the distribution of the busy periods of the system. Lemma
5.18 demonstrates that every (non-zero sized) busy period of the system that uses
the priority policy has the same distribution as that of a round-robin system in
which Alice is the only user, in the limit the size of jobs from Bob goes to zero.
The result follows.
Corollary 5.22.
lim
→0
Ec,upper,Priority = Ec,λ2Priority = Ec,λ2RR = Ec,lowerRR . (5.45)
Proof. The result follows from the set of inequalities in (5.9), and from the result
of Theorem 5.16.
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Figure 5.7: Plot of Ec,λ2RR /Ec,λ2Max for the two cases when the clock period is c = 2
and c = 5. A curve for Ec,λP /Ec,λ2Max lies below Ec,lowerRR /Ec,λ2Max for any
work-conserving policy P.
5.5 Discussion
Recall that Ec,λ2Priority is a bound on the performance of all work-conserving policies,
which is also equal to Ec,λ2RR , the privacy offered by round-robin. These errors are
normalized by Ec,λ2Max, the maximum privacy that any policy can offer. A normal-
ized error close to zero means that the policy offers very little privacy, and if it
is close to one, the attacker learns no information about Alice’s arrival pattern.
In Figure 5.7, we plot Ec,λ2RR /Ec,λ2Max as a function of λ, the arrival rate of jobs from
Alice. In the plot, we consider two scenarios, one where the clock period is set
to two, and the other where it is set to five. As expected, the attacker, Bob, in-
curs a higher normalized error when he wishes to estimate Alice’s arrivals with
greater precision. The curves represent the maximum estimation error that the
best attacker will incur against any work-conserving policy. Note that there is
a relatively large gap between the privacy performance of work-conserving and
policies that are allowed to idle. For instance, when Alice’s arrival rate is less
than 0.4, any work-conserving policy can guarantee a privacy no greater than just
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10% of the privacy that can be guaranteed by TDMA. In [71], Armbrust et al. state
that in most cloud computing platforms, the load is typically less than 0.2. In such
scenarios, the designers of the system need to be aware of the existence and pos-
sible exploitation of the timing based side channel discussed in this work. In the
“high-traffic regime,” the privacy offered by the round-robin policy is comparable
to that by TDMA. The reason behind this is the following. As stated in Theorem
5.9, the maximum information that the attacker can learn by performing any at-
tack against the round-robin policy is the start and end times of the busy periods of
the scheduling system. When Alice’s rate is high, most of the busy periods are of
extremely long duration. When busy periods are long, there are several possible
arrival patterns of Alice that could lead to the same busy period. Therefore, the
attacker learns very little by performing the attack, and therefore incurs a large
error. While the curves can be computed for all values of λ < 1, doing so for
higher values of λ requires computation of factorials of large numbers. Owing to
the possible numerical errors involved in these computations, we skip plotting the
curve in this regime.
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CHAPTER 6
PROVABLY SECURE SCHEDULING
POLICIES
In this chapter, we derive two policies that are resistant to any attacks that the at-
tacker might possibly launch. The first policy, accumulate and serve pre-distorts
the arriving traffic before serving them. This erases the fine-grained timing infor-
mation that the attacker can learn. The second policy takes a different approach.
TDMA leaks no information of one user’s arrivals to the other because slots are
statically reserved ahead of time. The second policy, proportional TDMA, uses
this same principle to guarantee minimal information leakage; however, it is de-
signed so that these reservations alter adaptively at a slow rate so as to minimize
delays incurred by the users. We discuss these two policies in the following.
6.1 Accumulate and Serve Policy
The accumulate and serve policy is shown in Figure 6.1. In this policy, the sched-
uler accumulates all the incoming jobs in its buffer for a period of T time units. It
then serves all the accumulated jobs from user 1, followed by all the accumulated
jobs from user 2, followed by those from user 3, and so on. In the two-user sce-
nario discussed before, user 1 could be the attacker, or Alice. If serving all these
jobs takes M units of time and if M < T , then the scheduler idles for the remain-
ing T −M time before beginning to serve the accumulated jobs. The intuition for
such a policy stems from the fact that buffering destroys the timing information
of the arrival times of the jobs, thereby reducing the amount of information that
can be extracted by the attacker. The attacker can therefore learn, at most, the
total number of jobs that arrived from Alice in the accumulate period, and nothing
more fine-grained. Our subsequent analysis will make use of this fact to show
that this policy provides guaranteed levels of privacy to Alice, irrespective of any
attack that can be launched by Bob. Using the Foster-Lyapunov stability theorem,
it can be shown that the scheduling policy is stable when the sum of rates from all
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the users is less than 1; the same is proved in Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 6.1. The accumulate and serve policy is stable, i.e., the queues do not
blow to infinity, as long as the sum of the arrival rates from all the users is less
than the service rate. Consequently, this scheduling policy is throughput optimal.
Furthermore, in steady state, the expected number of unserved jobs in the system
can be bounded by
E[Qn] ≤

√
λT if λ < λ∗T
λ+(1−λ)2
2(1−λ) if λ ≥ λ∗T
, (6.1)
where λ∗T =
2T+1−√1+4T
2T
.
Proof. Let Qn be the number of jobs waiting to be served at the beginning of the
nth accumulate period, i.e., at time nT−. Because T is an integer multiple of the
service time, note that there are no jobs with partially completed service at this
time, and therefore the total work in the system at the end of accumulate period
is always an integer. Let An denote the total number of jobs that arrive from all
the users in the nth accumulate period. Then, Qn is a Markov chain with the state
space Z+, and state update equation given by
Qn+1 = (Qn + An − T )+, (6.2)
where the notation (i)+ stands for max{0, i}. This is because, along with the jobs
already waiting to be served at time nT−, An number of jobs arrive. Out of these,
at most T of them get served in the accumulate period. The stability of this queue
also implies that the mean waiting times of the jobs are always bounded as long
as the sum of arrival rates from all the users is less than the service rate.
For a state q ∈ Z+, define the Lyapunov function to be V (q) = q2/2. We
will use Foster-Lyapunov’s theorem to show that the Markov chain is positive
recurrent. Let λ be the sum of the arrival rates. Consider the case when each of
the arrival processes is a Poisson process, then the cumulative arrival process is
a Poisson process as well. An is then a Poisson random variable with parameter
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Switch 2 
flow 1 
flow 2 
Figure 6.1: Pictorial representation of the accumulate and serve policy. The
switches close every T time units. All the accumulated jobs from user 1 are
served followed by jobs from user 2. The two flows correspond to jobs issued by
the two users.
λT . Given Qn = q, the expected value of the drift is given by
E[V (Qn+1)− V (Qn)|Qn = q]
= E
[
((q + An − T )+)2 − q2
2
]
≤ 1
2
E
[
(q + An − α)2 − q2
]
, α ≤ T (6.3)
=
1
2
(
(q − α)2 + λT + (λT )2 + 2λT (q − α)− q2
)
=
λT + (α− λT )2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
− (α− λT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
q, (6.4)
where (6.3) follows because, for real numbers i, α, β, ((i−β)+)2 ≤ (i−α)2,∀α ≤
β. By setting α to T , the condition for the system to be stable translates to λ < 1.
This is because, if λ < 1, then K2 > 0, and therefore the expected drift of the
Lyapunov function is negative for q large enough.
Furthermore, one can bound the mean number of jobs in the queue in the steady
state by
E[Qn] ≤ K1
K2
=
λT + (α− λT )2
2(α− λT ) . (6.5)
The bound in (6.5) holds for all values of α in the range (λT, T ]. Choosing the
value of α that results in the tightest bound, we achieve (6.1).
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6.1.1 Analysis
Theorem 6.2. A lower bound on the privacy offered by the accumulate and serve
policy is given by
Ec,λ2AccServe ≥ λ2c
(
1− c
T
)
+
= Ec,λ2Max
(
1− c
T
)
+
. (6.6)
Some remarks about the consequences of Theorem 6.2:
• The accumulate and serve policy guarantees a certain level of privacy re-
gardless of the attacker Bob’s strategy. Furthermore, if the accumulate pe-
riod is chosen to be large enough so that c
T
 1, then the estimation error
incurred by the attacker gets increasingly close to the maximum estimation
error, which is what he would have incurred by just using the statistics of
Alice’s arrival. The price paid for choosing a very large value for T is of
course the delay experienced by jobs. Delay analysis is carried out in Chap-
ter 7. When T is chosen to be 5 times c or greater, the ratio is greater than
0.8, irrespective of the attacker’s strategy.
• It is important to note that the error does not depend on the strategy em-
ployed by the attacker. In particular, it does not depend on the rate at which
the attacker issues his jobs, which seems unusual. This is a consequence of
the result in Lemma 6.3, which says that when the attacker is given mini-
mum additional information (by a genie) about total number of jobs in an
accumulate period, his arrival and departure times carry no additional use-
ful information for the purpose of estimation. The rate at which the attacker
issues his jobs, however, does determine the gap between true estimation
error and the genie aided error.
• The bound EcMax
(
1− c
T
)
+
evaluates to 0 when c ≥ T , which is not very
useful. However, we are mostly interested in the scenario when T is chosen
to be large enough to guarantee a degree of protection against a given value
of c.
Proof. An outline of the proof is as follows. Let A be an attack strategy, and let
PA be the resulting estimation error incurred by the attacker, Bob. Suppose he
is given a side information S, and if PSA is the resulting estimation error, then, it
must be the case that PA ≥ PSA. We construct a special side information such
that PSA = PS ; i.e., with the side information, the estimation error incurred by the
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attacker is independent of the attack strategy. Then, we have the following set of
inequalities:
Ec,λ2AccServe = minA PA ≥ minA P
S
A (6.7)
= min
A
PS (6.8)
= PS . (6.9)
In the following, we specify this side information and provide a rigorous proof.
Suppose that n jobs from Bob arrive in M accumulate periods. Let BM1 which
denotes the vector {B1, B2, . . . , BM}, be the number of jobs arriving from Al-
ice in accumulate periods 1, 2, . . . ,M respectively. BM1 is the side information
given to the attacker. The following lemma shows that the side information is the
maximum information the attacker can hope to learn.
Lemma 6.3. If the attacker, Bob, is given the side informationBM1 , the arrival and
completion times of his jobs carry no information and can be discarded. LetXk be
the random variable denoting the number of jobs that arrive from Alice in between
clock ticks k − 1 and k. The conditional expectation, E(Xk|tn1 , t′n1 , sn1 , BM1 ) is the
same as E(Xk|BM1 ).
Proof. Consider the conditional probability distribution Pr(Xk|BM1 , tn1 , t′n1 , sn1 ).
If accumulate and serve policy is used at the scheduler, the departure times of
Bob’s jobs are just a function of the arrival times and the size of his jobs, and the
sequence {B1, B2, . . . , BM}. Therefore,
Pr(Xk|BM1 , tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 )
=
Pr(Xk, B
M
1 , t
n
1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 )
Pr(BM1 , t
n
1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 )
=
Pr(Xk, B
M
1 , t
n
1 , s
n
1 )
Pr(BM1 , t
n
1 , s
n
1 )
Pr(t
′n
1 |Xk, BM1 , tn1 , sn1 )
Pr(t
′n
1 |BM1 , tn1 , sn1 )
= Pr(Xk|BM1 , tn1 , sn1 ), (6.10)
where (6.10) follows because t′n1 is a function of t
n
1 , s
n
1 and B
M
1 .
Also,Xk denotes the number of arrivals from Alice that have arrived in between
clock ticks k − 1 and k. The arrivals from both Alice and Bob are independent,
and hence, Xk is independent of the arrival times and size of jobs from Bob. Thus,
Pr(Xk|BM1 , tn1 , sn1 ) = Pr(Xk|BM1 ).
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As a result of Lemma 6.3, if the attacker, Bob, is given BM1 , the conditional
distribution of Xk, and hence the resulting estimation error he will incur, is in-
dependent of the timing and number of jobs that the attacker sends. Also, if the
resulting estimation error is denoted by Ec,BM1AccServe, then, from (6.9),
Ec,λ2AccServe ≥ Ec,B
M
1
AccServe. (6.11)
This is because, we are giving the attacker extra information which is not directly
available to him. With this information, the attacker can only be better off in
his estimation procedure. Hence, Ec,BM1AccServe bounds the estimation error that the
attacker incurs, and we will shortly show that this is large enough. Next, we turn
our attention to computing Ec,BM1AccServe.
We first consider the case when the following hold:
C1 The accumulate period, T , is an integer multiple of c, the duration of a clock
period.
C2 At time 0, the first clock tick aligns with the start of the first accumulate
period.
If conditions C1 and C2 are met, every clock period is then completely contained
within an accumulate period.
Suppose that the clock period k is contained within the accumulate period m.
Let Xk denote the number of arrivals from Alice in clock period k, and let Xk
denote the number of arrivals from Alice in the other clock periods in accumulate
period m. Then, it can be shown that, conditioned on the total number of ar-
rivals in accumulate period m, Bm, Xk is independent of the arrivals in the other
accumulate periods. Therefore, Pr(Xk|BM1 ) = Pr(Xk|Bm). For a Poisson pro-
cess, conditioned on the total number of arrivals in a given period, the arrival times
themselves are uniformly distributed in the period [64]. Therefore, conditioned on
Bm = βm, the distribution of Xk is a binomial random variable with parameters
(βm,
c
T
). Given the value of βm, the best estimate for Xk is then cT βm. Thus, the
estimation error incurred by the attacker in a slot in which βm jobs arrived is equal
to the variance of the Binomial random variable equal to Eβm = βm cT
(
1− c
T
)
.
Given that βm itself is a random variable, we need to average over its distribution
to get the estimation error incurred by the attacker. βm is Poisson with mean λ2T ,
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and the estimation error in a typical clock period is
Eβm [Eβm ] = Eβm [βm
c
T
(
1− c
T
)
]
= λ2c
(
1− c
T
)
= EcMax
(
1− c
T
)
, (6.12)
where (6.12) follows from (4.1).
When the conditions C1 and C2 do not hold, it can be shown the estimation
error incurred by the attacker is greater than Ec,λ2Max
(
1− c
T
)
. It can be shown that
the empirical average of the estimation error incurred in a clock period, as given
in (6.12) is also equal to the time average of the estimation error incurred by
the attacker, which, as defined in (3.2) is the privacy metric we are interested in.
Therefore, Ec,BM1Acc Serve = Ec,λ2Max
(
1− c
T
)
.
The case when c > T: If c > T , then the side informationBM1 of the attacker is
finer than the information which he wishes to extract from Alice’s arrival process.
Therefore, in such a case, the estimation error incurred by the attacker is equal
to zero. Recall that in reality the attacker does not have this side information,
and he has to infer it based on the arrival and departure times of his jobs. We
are not interested in analyzing this case as we expect that in a system design, the
accumulate period will be chosen to be sufficiently larger than c.
6.2 Proportional TDMA (p-TDMA) Policy
As stated before, TDMA achieves the highest privacy because the times at which
the attacker, Bob, gets served are known to him a priori, he learns nothing by
performing the attack. The p-TDMA policy builds upon this idea. In the two-
user scenario, the policy divides time into slots, and at time 0, the policy statically
assigns all odd numbered slots to user 1 and even numbered slots to user 2, just like
TDMA. At the end of an adaptation period M , the policy computes the empirical
rates at which the two users have been issuing jobs to the scheduler, λˆ1 and λˆ2.
Between times M and 2M , each time slot is reserved for user 1 with probability
λˆ1
λˆ1+λˆ2
, and user 2 with probability λˆ2
λˆ1+λˆ2
. At time 2M , the scheduler recomputes
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the empirical rates, and uses the new rates to decide whether to reserve a slot to
serve user 1 or user 2. The policy continues to update the empirical rates every M
time units. The idea is that the policy eventually learns the true rates at which the
users issue jobs, and allocates times in proportion to these rates, thus reducing the
delays incurred.
6.2.1 Analysis
Theorem 6.4.
Ec,λ2p−TDMA ≥ Ec,λ2Max
(
1− c
M
)
+
. (6.13)
Proof. The analysis is very similar to that of the accumulate and serve policy.
The policy depends only on the empirical rates at which jobs are issued to the
scheduler. If the attacker, Bob, is given the side information about how many jobs
Alice has issued in each adaptation period, his arrival and departure times carry
no further information and can be discarded. The result follows.
Some remarks about this policy follow:
• Unlike the accumulate and serve policy that trades off delay for privacy, the
p-TDMA policy trades off adaptation time for privacy. The larger the value
of the adaptation period M , the longer it takes for the policy to learn the
true arrival rates. However, for stationary arrival processes, the long run
average delay is independent of the duration of the adaptation period. The
reason for this is as follows. Irrespective of the value ofM , after a sufficient
number of adaptation periods, the empirical rates converge to the true rates,
and stay that way. Therefore, in the long run, the delay experienced by
the jobs is independent of M . In theory, by choosing a large enough value
of M , this policy is guaranteed to perform close to TDMA on the privacy
metric without the excessive delay penalty.
• In a practical system, if the arrivals are not stationary, i.e., the statistical
description of the arrival process changes with time, or if a user issues jobs
only for a short duration which is insufficient for the policy to learn the true
arrival rate from him, the delays incurred by the user can still be large. One
would have to choose the value of M wisely to strike a balance between the
performance for short flows, and the privacy it offers.
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• Finally, it is important to note that this policy is not a work-conserving
policy. Once a slot is reserved for one user, the processor just stays idle if
that user has no jobs to be processed in that slot. This policy does incur
greater mean delay than a work-conserving policy.
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CHAPTER 7
DELAY ANALYSIS
The delay experienced by the jobs would depend on the total number of users of
the system and the specific patterns of arrivals from them. For purposes of delay
comparison, we will consider a scenario where all the users of the system have
time invariant arrival statistics. This would be the delay incurred when all users
are legitimate innocuous users. This is a reasonable assumption, as during the
“normal” mode of scheduler operation, when there are only legitimate users using
the scheduler, the policy should offer the minimum possible delay to the jobs. We
will consider the case where there are M users of the system, traffic from user i
being a Poisson traffic with parameter λi, size of all the jobs being equal to 1 time
unit. Define λ =
∑M
i=1 λi. We will compute the average delay of a job (averaged
over all the jobs from all the users) for each of the policies discussed here.
Theorem 7.1. The mean delay experienced by a job for FCFS, TDMA, accumu-
late and serve and p-TDMA scheduling policies is given by,
DFCFS = 1 + λ
2(1− λ) (7.1)
DTDMA = 1 + M
2
+
M∑
i=1
λi
λ
λiM
2
2(1− λiM) (7.2)
DAcc Serve ≤ 1 + λ(T + 1)
2
+
λ+ T (1− λ)2
2(1− λ) I{λ>λ∗T } +
√
λT I{λ<λ∗T }
(7.3)
Dp-TDMA = 1 + 1
2(1− λ) +
M − 1
1− λ , (7.4)
where, λ∗T =
2T+1−√1+4T
2T
.
Proof. Mean delay of FCFS and TDMA policies: The FCFS system is a simple
M/D/1 queue, and the mean delay can be derived from Polleczek and Khin-
chine’s formula for the M/G/1 system [72]. For the proof for TDMA, see [73].
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Mean delay of accumulate and serve policy: The arriving jobs are stored in the
buffer until the start of the next accumulate period. A job, chosen at random gets
delayed by T/2 time units at this stage. From the point of view of the processor,
the inputs to the queue are batch arrivals which arrive every T time units, and the
size of a batch is a Poisson random variable. The average delay across all jobs
does not depend on the order in which jobs are served by the server, as long as the
server does not idle. For delay analysis, we can therefore assume that the server
serves these jobs in FCFS manner. In reality, recall that the server serves all the
jobs from one user followed by all the jobs from the other user.
Let Ak denote the size of the batch that arrives at the end of the accumulate
period k and Qk be the number of jobs that are not yet served at the end of period
k. By the FCFS assumption, Qk is also the time the arriving batch waits before
it gets served. The queue update equation is given in (6.2), and consequently, the
bounds derived in the proof of Lemma 6.1 hold. Therefore, the mean waiting time
before a batch of jobs starts getting served is upper bounded by λ+(1−λ)
2
2(1−λ) I{λ≥λ∗T }+√
λT I{λ<λ∗T }.
In order to compute the mean delay experienced by a job, first note that a job
drawn at random from the first K jobs, where K is a large number, has a higher
chance of belonging to a bigger batch than a smaller one. In fact, the probability
that a job drawn at random belongs to a batch of size b is given by bP(Ak=b)
E[Ak]
. Given
that the job is from a batch of size b, the mean number of jobs ahead of it can be
shown to be b−1
2
, consequently, conditional on the batch size to be b, the job has to
wait for an additional time of b−1
2
time units after the batch starts service before it
can get served. Averaging over b, we can get the additional waiting time of a jobs
drawn at random before it gets served to be
∑
b
b
Pr(Ak = b)
E[Ak]
(
b− 1
2
)
=
E[A2k]− E[Ak]
2E[Ak]
=
λT
2
. (7.5)
Once it gets to service, the service time of the job is a fixed 1 time unit. There-
fore, the delay experienced by a job drawn at random, which is the mean delay
offered by the scheduling policy is bounded by (7.3).
Mean delay of p-TDMA policy: If the arrival process from each user is a
Poisson process of rate λi, in the steady state, the empirical arrival rates converge
to the true arrival rates. User i gets service in a time slot with probability λi/λ.
Let Qn be the number of unserved jobs from user i at the beginning of time slot
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n. We then have the following queuing equation,
Qn+1 = (Qn −Dn)+ + An,
where An denotes the number of job arrivals between times n and n+1, which is
a Poisson random variable with mean λi, and Dn is a Bernoulli random variable
which takes the value 1 if user i gets served in time slot n, which happens with
probability λi/λ, or 0 otherwise. The queuing equation holds because the system
serves only jobs that have already arrived by time n in time slot n.
In the steady state, both Qn and Qn+1 have the same distribution. Let qi
.
=
Pr(Qn = i) = Pr(Qn+1 = i), and Q(z) .=
∞∑
i=0
qiz
i be the Z-transform of the
steady-state distribution. We then have
Q(z) = E[zQn+1 ] = E[z(Qn−Dn)++An ] (7.6)
= q0E[z
An ]
(
q0E[z
(−Dn)+ ] +
∞∑
i=1
qiE[z
i−Dn ]
)
=
q0(λi/λ)e
λi(z−1)(1− z−1)
1− (1− (λi/λ) + (λi/λ)z−1)eλi(z−1) , (7.7)
where (7.6) follows from the queuing equation. Use the fact that lim
z→1
Q(z) = 1
to solve for q0 = (1 − λ). The mean number of unserved jobs from user i in the
steady state is then equal to
∞∑
i=0
iqi = lim
z→1
Q˙(z), which can be computed. Using
Little’s law to relate the average queue length to the mean delay experienced by a
job from user i, and averaging it across all users of the system, we get the result
given in equation (7.4). The result also includes the time 1/2, the mean time an
arriving job waits before the nearest multiple of one time unit.
Some remarks about the mean delay computed:
• For FCFS, accumulate and serve, and p-TDMA, the mean delay is finite,
equivalently, the system is stable, when the sum of the rates from all the
users is less than 1, i.e., λ =
∑M
i=1 λi < 1. However, for TDMA, the mean
delay is finite only when the rate from each user is less than 1/M , i.e., when
λi < 1/M . Therefore, TDMA loses out on multiplexing gains.
• lim
λ→1
DAcc Serve
DFCFS = 1, i.e., at high traffic loads, the mean delay offered by the
accumulate and serve policy is equal to that when FCFS policy is used. In
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Figure 7.1: The ratios DACC−SERV EDFCFS ,
DTDMA
DFCFS and
Dp−TDMA
DFCFS for two scenarios. In
the first scenario, there are four users of the system with λ1 = λ2 = 0.1,
λ3 = 0.2, and λ4 is varied between 0 and 0.6. In the second scenario, there are
two users of the system and λ1 = 0.4, and λ2 is varied from 0 to 0.6. Note that
the mean delays blow up for large rates when TDMA policy is used. The
accumulate period T is set to 25.
the other extreme, lim
λ→0
DAcc Serve
DFCFS = 1+
T
2
, which can be quite large especially
if T is chosen to be large. For TDMA, the same limit would be 1 + M
2
. For
p − TDMA, it is 1/2 +M . Depending on the values of M and T , either
TDMA or accumulate and serve might offer the least mean delay.
• In Figure 7.1, we plot the delays of the different scheduling policies as a
multiple of the delay of FCFS scheduling policy for two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, there are four users of the system, λ1 = λ2 = 0.1,
λ3 = 0.2, and λ4 is varied between 0 and 0.6. In the second scenario, there
are only two users, λ1 = 0.4, and λ2 is varied from 0 to 0.6. When there
are four users using the system, the fourth user cannot issue jobs faster than
rate 0.25, consequently utilizing only 40% of the bandwidth available to him
(0.25/0.6). When accumulate and serve is used, the fourth user can utilize
all the bandwidth that is available. For the plot, T is set to 25. Recall that
if the resolution at which information is to be learned, c, is less than 5, then
by choosing T to be 25, we can guarantee that the estimation error incurred
by an attacker, Bob, will be more than 80% of the maximum error that he
can incur.
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CHAPTER 8
NETWORK SCENARIO
Thus far, this thesis dealt with a scheduling system being used by two users, and
how in such a scenario the queuing side channel can be exploited by one of the
users to snoop on the other. What happens when multiple users share the same
scheduling system? The queuing side channel continues to exist in this scenario as
well, however, the attacker learns less fine-grained information leading to noisier
estimates. Also, a very important difference between the two-user scenario and
the multiple user one is that the ordering of policies on the privacy metric could
be different. As an example, suppose the scheduling system is used by Alice, Bob
and Eve, and it is Bob who wishes to snoop on the activities of Alice. If FCFS
scheduling policy is used, Bob can learn the cumulative arrival pattern from both
Alice and Eve, and nothing more. If he further knows the statistics of the arrivals
from Alice and Eve, say both of them issue jobs at a rate λ2, the best estimate
of the arrivals from Alice is half of the cumulative arrivals. Because this is only
a statistical estimate, it is error prone. So unlike in the two-user scenario, the
privacy of the FCFS policy is not zero. In particular, in the limit, the arrival rate of
Alice and Eve, we have lim
λ2→0
Ec,λ2FCFS/Ec,λ2TDMA = 1/2. Now consider the case when
round-robin policy is used. Consider the following attack strategy. Bob invites
his confederate Oscar to assist him with the attack. Oscar joins the scheduling
system as the fourth user. Suppose the order in which the scheduling system serves
jobs from the four users is Alice followed by Bob followed by Eve followed by
Oscar. If a job from Bob is served immediately after a job from Oscar departs,
they know that all of Alice’s outstanding jobs have been served by then, and if
a job from Oscar is served immediately after a job from Bob, they know that all
outstanding jobs from Eve have been served by then. The information obtained by
Bob through such an attack is more than the cumulative arrivals from Alice and
Eve. In particular, lim
λ2→0
Ec,λ2RR /Ec,λ2TDMA = 0. Therefore, for a certain set of arrival
rates from Alice and Eve, the privacy of the round-robin policy is lower than that
of the FCFS policy.
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In this chapter, we do not attempt to characterize the privacy of scheduling
policies in multi-user scenarios. Instead what we show is that the queueing side
channel can still be exploited for other nefarious activities.
8.1 Motivating Example
Consider the scenario shown in Figure 8.1, where two users Alice and Bob are
communicating with each other using the Internet. Another user, Eve wishes
to determine if Alice is communicating with Bob or not. As an example, Bob
could be transferring a file to Alice, which is shown as the blue arrows. In the
background, both Alice and Bob could be browsing on their computers, shown in
yellow and purple arrows. In this chapter, we propose a flow linking attack that
Eve could use to determine if Alice and Bob are communicating with each other
or not.
If Eve could directly monitor all the network links, she can easily figure out if
there is a network flow from Alice to Bob. For instance, if the source and des-
tination addresses in the headers of the packets are not modified by the network,
[74] gives one technique. Even if the packets are routed through an anonymizing
network, or if the headers are modified in some other manner, but if the packet
timestamps are available, Eve can correlate the inter-packet-delays (IPDs) of the
packets flowing into Alice’s computer and out of Bob’s computer as described
in [75]. In this chapter, we demonstrate that a similar correlation-based detector
can be used by Eve even if she does not have the timestamps. The basic idea
behind our detection strategy is the following. The number of packets departing
the first router is positively correlated with the number of packets entering the
second router if there is a common flow. We show that by sending frequent but
small-sized probes to the two routers, and recording their round-trip-times (RTTs)
followed by a minimal processing of the collected data, Eve can estimate the de-
parture and arrival processes. If the flows are sufficiently long lasting, she can
accurately infer if there is a common flow or not.
The flow linking problem, the problem of determining if two network flows are
the same or not, arises is several contexts. A couple of example scenarios are: (1)
detecting stepping stone attacks, and (2), de-anonymizing users of an anonymous
network. A stepping stone is a node that acts as a relay for network traffic, and is
used to hide the true origin of an attack. Generally, stepping stones are detected
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Figure 8.1: Alice and Bob are communicating with each other, shown in blue (t).
In addition to communicating with Bob, Alice might be browsing other content
on the Internet, shown in yellow (b). Similarly, background flows at Bob’s end
are shown in purple (b). Eve issues regularly spaced pings, shown in red (p), to
Alice’s and Bob’s DSL routers to infer if they are communicating with each other
or not.
by matching the outgoing traffic from one computer to another. When the network
connections are encrypted, only packet counts and their timing information can be
used to match two flows. Detection techniques are of two types. Passive methods
such as [76, 77] correlate the IPDs in two flows. If the stepping stone changes the
statistical properties of the flow before re-transmitting, these detection techniques
might not work as well. However, in [76], the authors show that if the stepping
stone does not add too much delay, a wavelet-based detection scheme is guaran-
teed to match the two flows. In [78], a counting-based scheme is proposed to
detect stepping stones when no packets are added or dropped, and when the delay
added is bounded.
In order to reduce the time required to detect stepping stones, active detection
techniques such as [75, 38, 79, 80] have been proposed. In these schemes, network
watermarks are added to all the flows; i.e., a little jitter is added to one or more
packets in each flow. Watermarks are also useful when the IPDs between the
different flows in the network are very similar to each other. This is the case
with peer-peer VoIP calls, as shown in [81], wherein, the addition of the network
watermark aids the linking of two VoIP calls.
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A key assumption in all these works listed above is the availability of flow tim-
ing information. For passive detection techniques, it is generally assumed that
the border routers, through which flows enter and leave an enterprise, record the
timestamps of all the packets. This information is later used to detect if an in-
coming flow matches an outgoing one, which will then indicate the presence of a
stepping stone inside the network. Also, altering IPDs to introduce watermarks,
used in active detection techniques, requires special privileges. While these are
permissible operations by a network administrator inside an enterprise network,
they are not feasible when the flows traverse through multiple ISPs. This is typ-
ically the scenario considered when the goal of the detector is to de-anonymize
users of an anonymous network such as Tor [82]. In Tor, a user connects to a
destination through an overlay network of Tor nodes. The flows between these
Tor nodes are encrypted, thereby making it difficult for an eavesdropper to link
source-destination pairs. These nodes are located across different ISPs, therefore
obtaining timestamps of flows traversing these nodes is infeasible. In these sce-
narios, flow correlation can still be used to match flows, like in [48] and [83], if
either the source of the flow, or the destination is compromised. In [48], Murdoch
and Danezis consider a scenario wherein a user connects to a rogue website using
Tor. It is the website’s intent to de-anonymize the user. In [83], the server hides its
identity, and it is the client’s intent to locate it. In both these works, the website,
in [48], and the client, in [83], modulate the traffic, which can be thought of as
adding a watermark, and simultaneously probe a suspect node. It then correlates
the traffic modulation and latency of the probes to infer if the flow is being routed
through the node or not. Our work is similar in spirit to these works, in that we
look for correlations in probe latencies. However, unlike the works above, we do
not require the flow to be modulated, in fact the eavesdropper is not in control of
the flow at all.
In the following, we propose a hypothesis testing problem to measure the per-
formance of the proposed detector. We make the following assumptions in order
to create a tractable problem. We assume that the variation in probe latencies
is largely due to the delays added at the last hops. As mentioned before, this is
true because the other links in the core of the Internet have significantly higher
bandwidth. Also, for the same reason, it is assumed that when the packets travel
from Bob’s computer to Alice, the shape of the traffic is preserved. Also, we as-
sume that no packets are dropped. These assumptions are required for theoretical
analysis and are not crucial otherwise.
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Figure 8.2: It is the eavesdropper’s intent to figure out if there is a common flow
between routers 1 and 2 or not. She bases her decision on the probe latencies to
the two routers.
8.2 A Hypothesis Testing Problem
In order to derive analytical expressions, we will consider a simplified system
model, depicted in Figure 8.2. Through simulations, we show that the same strat-
egy can be applied in other scenarios as well. The flow between Alice and Bob is
referred to in the following as test flow. Bob’s router is labeled as router 1, and
Alice’s as router 2. We wish to infer if the test flow of rate λt enters router 2 upon
exiting router 1. Under hypothesis 1 (H1), this test flow flows through router 1,
followed by router 2. In addition to the test flow, there are additional flows through
these routers as well. These additional flows are shown as background flows with
a net rate λb. Therefore, in this scenario, the net rate of flows into each of the
routers is λt + λb. The test flow of rate λt is common to the two routers. Under
hypothesis 0 (H0), the test flow through router 1 does not enter router 2. In this
scenario, the net flows to each of the two routers is still λt+λb, but the flows are in-
dependent. It is Eve’s intent to detect the true hypothesis. We make the following
assumptions to derive the results that follow. The flows are modeled as Poisson
processes, i.e., the packet inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed. Also,
the sizes of the packets are modeled as exponential random variables of mean 1.
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(a) No traffic (b) High traffic
Figure 8.3: The arrival and departure times of the ping probes shown in two
scenarios. The upward pointing arrows are the arrival times of the packets and
the downward pointing arrows are the departure times. The solid arrows are the
ping probes and the dotted ones are the other packets in the network.
The capacity of each of the two routers is assumed to be 1.
8.2.1 Remote Traffic Analysis
To learn the number of packets departing router 1 and entering router 2, Eve does
the following. She sends frequently spaced ping probes to each of the two routers
and measures the RTTs, i.e., she sends a sequence of ping probes to each of the two
routers at times tn = nd, n = 1, 2, 3, . . ., and measures their RTT. For theoretical
analysis, the size of these ping probes, δ, are chosen to be smaller than d. Routers
typically serve packets in a FCFS manner. Suppose that the ping probes depart the
router at times t′n, n = 1, 2, 3, . . .. Eve infers that the number of packets arriving
at a router (1 or 2) in the interval ((n − 1)d, nd), and departing in time interval
((dt′n/de − 1)d, dt′n/ded), to be 1 if t′n > (max(t′n−1, tn) + δ), and 0 otherwise.
As shown in Theorem 4.2, this estimate becomes increasingly accurate as d gets
smaller. This follows from the fact that when the router serves the packets in a
first-in-first-out manner, the inter-departure time between two packets is directly
proportional to the volume of packets that arrive in between, see Figure 8.3. In
fact, a remote user can always estimate the arrival and departure processes with
high accuracy using the strategy described in Section 5.1 as long as the router uses
a work-conserving scheduling policy.
Let E1i denote the total volume of packets departing router 1 in between times
(d(i − 1), di). Let E2i denote the total volume of packets arriving at router 2
in between the same times. Using the aforementioned strategy, Eve learns this
information accurately. Suppose, in total there are n probes sent. Using the obser-
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vations {E1i , E2i }ni=1, she has to distinguish between the two hypothesis H0 and
H1.
The sum of two independent Poisson processes (one test flow, and the other the
background flow) is also a Poisson process of rate λt + λb. The packet sizes are
assumed to be exponential. The ping probes sent by the Eve are small compared to
the sizes of packets of the test and background flows. The first router can therefore
be modeled as an M/M/1 queue [72]. From Burke’s theorem, for a stable M/M/1
queue, the departure process is a Poisson process as well, of rate λb + λt, and
each output is a packet from the test flow with probability λt
λt+λb
and from the
background flow with probability λb
λt+λb
[72]. As a result, the arrival process at
the second router, which consists of the departure process of the test flow from
router 1, and the second background process is also a Poisson process. Therefore,
under H1, the number of packets arriving at router 1 in time-slot i is Xi + Yi,
where Xi is the random variable indicating departures from router 1 from the
test flow, and Yi indicates the number of departures from the background flow 1.
The number of packets entering router 2 in time slot i is Xi + Zi, where Zi is
the number of packets entering the second router from background flow 2. Also,
Xi, Yi and Zi are independent Poisson random variables with means λtd, λbd and
λbd respectively. UnderH0, the number of packets departing router 1 in time slot
1 is Y˜i, and the number of packets entering router 2 in the same time slot is Z˜i. Y˜i
and Z˜i are independent Poisson random variables with the same mean, (λt+λb)d.
8.2.2 Optimal Detector
A standard result from detection theory states the Neyman-Pearson (NP) detector
is optimal in the sense that, for a fixed probability of false alarm, the NP detector
maximizes the probability of detection [84]. Under H1, the likelihood of observ-
ing the data {E1i , E2i }ni=1 is given by
Pr({E1i , E2i }ni=1|H1)
=
n∏
i=1
Pr(Xi + Yi = E
1
i , Xi + Zi = E
2
i ) (8.1)
=
n∏
i=1
∑
j
Pr(Xi = j) Pr(Yi = E
1
i − j) Pr(Zi = E2i − j).
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UnderH0, the number of packets departing router 1 in time slot 1 is Y˜i, and the
number of packets entering router 2 in the same time slot is Z˜i. The likelihood of
observing the data in this scenario is given by
Pr({E1i , E2i }ni=1|H0) =
n∏
i=1
Pr(Y˜i = E
1
i ) Pr(Z˜i = E
2
i ).
The NP detector declaresH1 if Pr({E
1
i ,E
2
i }ni=1|H1)
Pr({E1i ,E2i }ni=1|H0)
> γ, andH0 otherwise, where
the threshold γ decides the probability false alarm. However, the likelihood under
H1 is not easy to compute in closed form. Below we propose a sub-optimal, but
tractable, correlation-based detector with provable performance guarantees.
8.2.3 Correlation-Based Detector
Define µj = 1
n
n∑
i=1
Eji , for j = 1, 2. In the scenario the eavesdropper, Eve, does
not know the rates λt and λb a priori, she computes the correlation between the
two streams as:
C = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
E1i − µ1
) (
E2i − µ2
)
. (8.2)
Alternately, if Eve has knowledge of the rates of the flows, she computes the
correlation between the two streams as:
C = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
E1i − d(λt + λb)
) (
E2i − d(λt + λb)
)
. (8.3)
Theorem 8.1. For any 0 < 1, 2 < 1, there exists an observation time N 1,2
(given in (8.10)) and a threshold C1,2 (given in (8.9)) such that if the eavesdrop-
per observes the streams for a time greater than N 1,2d, computes the correlation
C and declares H1 if C > C1,2 and H0 otherwise, then it can be guaranteed that
the probability of detection is greater than 1−2 and the probability of false alarm
is smaller than 1.
In the following, we discuss the proof of the theorem in the scenario the eaves-
dropper has prior knowledge of the rates λt and λb. The case for the other scenario
when these have to be estimated is very similar.
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Lemma 8.2. Under H0, the mean and variance of the are E[C|H0] = 0, and
Var[C|H0] = 1n(λt + λb)2d2. Under H1, E[C|H1] = λtd and Var[C|H1] =
1
n
(λtd+ λ
2
td
2 + (λt + λb)
2d2).
Proof. As discussed in Section 8.2.2, underH1, E1i = Xi+Yi, andE2i = Xi+Zi,
where Xi, Yi and Zi are mutually independent Poisson random variables of mean
λtd, λbd and λbd respectively. Therefore, underH1,
E[C|H1]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Xi + Yi − d(λt + λb))(Xi + Zi − d(λt + λb))]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2i +Xi(Yi + Zi) + YiZi − d2(λt + λb)2]
= λtd (8.4)
C − λtd
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
((Xi − λtd)2 − λtd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
αi
+(Xi − λtd)(Yi − λbd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βi
+(Xi − λtd)(Zi − λbd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γi
+(Yi − λbd)(Zi − λbd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δi
. (8.5)
Note that each of the random variables {αi, βi, γi, δi}ni=1 is zero mean and are
mutually uncorrelated random variables. The variance of sum of mutually un-
correlated random variables is the sum of the variances of the random variables.
Therefore,
Var[C|H1] = Var[C − λtd|H1]
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
[
Var[αi] +Var[βi] +Var[γi] +Var[δi]
]
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
λtd(1 + 3λtd)− λ2td2 + 2λtλbd2 + λ2bd2
=
1
n
(
λtd+ λ
2
td
2 + (λt + λb)
2d2
)
. (8.6)
Now, under H0, E[C] = 1n
n∑
i=1
E[(Y˜i − d(λt + λb))]E[(Z˜i − d(λt + λb))] = 0.
This is because, the number of packets departing the first router is statistically
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independent of the number of packets entering the second one. Also, Var[C] =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
Var[(Y˜i−d(λt+λb))(Z˜i−d(λt+λb))] = 1n2
n∑
i=1
E[(Y˜i−d(λt+λb))2]E[(Z˜i−
d(λt+λb))
2] = 1
n
(λt+λb)
2d2. This result holds because the variables {(Y˜i−d(λt+
λb))(Z˜i−d(λt+λb))}ni=1 are mutually uncorrelated zero-mean random variables.
Fix a probability of false alarm, Pr(H1|H0), 1. A false alarm is generated
when C > C1,2 under scenarioH0. For a given C1,2 , underH0,
Pr(C > C1,2|H0) ≤ Pr(|C| > C1,2|H0)
≤ Var[C|H0]C1,22 , (8.7)
where (8.7) follows from Chebyshev’s inequality. The probability of detection,
Pr(H1|H1), can be lower bounded as follows:
Pr(C > C1,2 |H1) = 1− Pr(C < C1,2|H1)
≥ 1− Pr(|C − λtd| > λtd− C1,2|H1)
≥ 1− Var[C|H1]
(λtd− C1,2)2 . (8.8)
In order to evaluate N 1,2 , we equate Var[C|H0]C1,22 = 1 and
Var[C|H1]
(λtd−C1,2 )2 = 2.
Using ν1 to denote (λt + λb)d and ν2 to denote
√
(λtd+ λ2td
2 + (λt + λb)2d2),
we get
C1,2 = λtd ν1
√
2
ν1
√
2 + ν2
√
1
, (8.9)
and
n > N 1,2 =
1
12
(ν1
√
2 + ν2
√
1)
2
λ2td
2
. (8.10)
In the scenario, the eavesdropper does not know the mean rates of the test and
background flow, (8.2) is used to compute the correlation. Note that µ1 and µ2,
the empirical rates of the flows converge to the true rates, and therefore the cor-
relations computed are close to the ones above. The expressions for the mean
and variance of the correlation under the two hypotheses are different. They are
substantially more complex and are not given here for the sake of presentability.
In Figure 8.4, we plot the probability of detection, pd, for the correlation de-
tector as a function of the probability of false alarm, pf , known as the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC), for one set of rates λt and λb. As expected, the
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Figure 8.4: ROC curves for the correlation detector as a function of the
observation duration nd.
longer the observation time, nd, the better the correlation detector is in terms of
higher pd and lower pf . Notice that high probability of detection can be achieved
despite the fact that the rate of the background flow, λb, is five times the rate of
the test flow, λt. Next, we explore the effect of rate of the background flows on
the performance of the correlation detector in Figure 8.5. The rate of the test flow,
λt, is fixed at 0.05, and the probability of false alarm is set to 0.1. We plot the
probability of detection as a function of the rate of the background flow. More
background flow results in a noisier observation and worse performance for Eve.
However, by increasing the observation period, she can improve her accuracy.
8.3 Simulation
In this section we use simulations to study the performance of the proposed de-
tector by relaxing some of the assumptions made for theoretical analysis. The
Poisson Pareto Burst Process (PPBP) is a model for bursty Internet traffic [85].
We generate flows using this model. We set the mean arrival rate for the test flow
to be λt = 100 KBps, and the mean arrival rate of the background processes to
be λb = 200 KBps. For both these streams, the mean size of a packet is set to
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Figure 8.5: Probability of detection as a function of the ratio of the rate of the
background flow to the rate of the test flow.
1000 bytes. Eve issues ICMP ping packets which are of size 32 bytes. She issues
probes one every 10ms and observes their RTT. The net rate at which Eve issues
probes is therefore 3.2 KBps, significantly lower than the other data streams. The
router’s capacity is set to 2 MBps.
We generated samples of network streams for a fixed duration T . As described
in Section 8.2.1, Eve uses the RTT of her probes to estimate the departure process
from the first router and the arrival process into the second router. We simulated
200 such instances, we used 160 of these for training, and the classifier’s perfor-
mance was tested on the remaining 40. The training data was used to compute
the sample mean and sample variance under H0 and H1, call them µT0 , σT0 2, µT1
and σT1
2. If these sample means and variances indeed represented the true means
and variances of the correlation under the two scenarios, then, picking a threshold
C1,2 ,T such that µT0 + σ
T
0√
1
< C1,2 ,T < µT1 − σ
T
1√
2
guarantees a detection rate
greater than 1 − 2 and a false alarm rate less than 1. From the training data,
the threshold is computed such that the detection rate is greater than 90%, and
the false alarm rate is less than 10%. The other 40 instances are used to measure
the performance of the classifier. We then randomize over the choice of samples
for training and testing and re-compute the classification rates. In Figure 8.6, we
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Figure 8.6: Probability of detection and false alarm of the correlation based
detector as a function of the length of the experiment.
plot the averaged detection and false positive rates of the classifier for different
durations of the experiment T , and the 95% confidence intervals.
For small T , the classifier has poor detection rates and high false positive rates.
The longer the observations, the greater the noise from background flows gets
averaged out, leading to improved performance. When T is greater than 200
seconds, about 2.5 minutes, the classifier performs as desired. Recall that this
detection is possible despite the fact that the rate of the background flows at each
of the routers is twice as high as the test flows. This result demonstrates that the
assumptions made in the earlier section are not crucial to the performance of the
correlation-based classifier.
To conclude, we developed a remote correlation based detector which can be
used to detect if a common flow traverses through two routers are not. The eaves-
dropper, Eve, using the probe latencies, first estimates the departure times of pack-
ets from the first router, and the arrival times at the second router. She then cor-
relates the two, a high correlation indicating the presence of a common flow. Our
detector is robust to other noisy flows in the system, whose rates could be much
larger than the rate of the flow which is to be detected.
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CHAPTER 9
EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSION
To summarize, in this work, we consider the timing side channel that arises natu-
rally when a scheduler decides how two users share a common processor. Through
the scheduling policy used, the delays experienced by jobs from one user reveal
timing information about the jobs issued by the other user. This fact can poten-
tially be exploited by a malicious user. The goal of this work is to formally study
this problem and design policies that offer sufficient protection to its users while
not sacrificing significantly on the performance. We first introduce an estimation
error based metric to quantify the protection that a policy offers. On this metric,
we then show that commonly used policies perform poorly. The TDMA policy,
by reserving slots for each of the users, leaks no information between the users.
However, it is throughput sub-optimal and adds excessive delays, lending it im-
practical to be used in certain situations. Unfortunately, as we show, policies that
add minimal delay, the class of work-conserving policies, do not offer very high
levels of privacy to the users. We then design a few policies that trade off delay
for improved privacy.
9.1 Generalized Privacy Metric
Throughout this thesis, we have used the estimation error incurred by the attacker
as a measure of the privacy offered by the policy. However, all the results are
applicable more generally as well. Consider the following generalized definition
of privacy:
Pc,λ2,l(·,·)Scheduling policy =
lim
N→∞
min
n,tn1 ,s
n
1 :
N∑
i=1
si
Nc
<1−λ2
1
N
N∑
k=1
min
gNk (·)
E
[
l
(
Xk, g
N
k (t
n
1 , s
n
1 , t
′n
1 )
)]
, (9.1)
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where l(·, ·) is a non-negative loss function.
We will consider two types of loss functions,
1. Loss incurred when estimating Alice’s arrivals with a real number. l : Z ×
R → R+, where Z is the set of integers and R is the set of real numbers.
Examples of such loss functions include:
• The squared difference function, l(x, y) = (x − y)2. If a random
variable X is to be estimated, and a correlated random variable Y is
observed, then it is well known in estimation theory that
argmin
g(Y )
E
[
(X − g(Y ))2] = E[X|Y ],
and the resulting error is the MMSE given by E
[
(X − E[X|Y ])2].
This loss function leads to the privacy metric considered in this thesis.
• The absolute difference loss, l(x, y) = |x − y|. A key difference be-
tween the absolute difference loss compared to squared error loss is
that when summing up several error terms, the sum is not dominated
by the large error terms.
• Huber loss function is defined as
lθ(x, y) =
12(x− y)2 if |x− y| ≤ θθ(|x− y| − θ) otherwise .
For large θ the Huber loss function mimics the squared error, and for
smaller values of θ it mimics the absolute loss function.
• Zero-one loss function, l(x, y) = I(x 6= y), where I(·) is the indicator
function which is equal to one if the argument is true. If X and Y
are correlated random variables and X is to be estimated by observing
Y , then argming(Y )E[I(X 6= g(Y ))] = argmaxPX|Y (X|Y ) and
argming(Y )E[I(X 6= g(Y ))] = 1 − E
[
maxPX|Y (X|Y )
]
. This loss
function is well suited for classification problems.
2. Loss incurred when the attacker’s observations are used to infer a distribu-
tion on Alice’s arrivals. l : Z × P(Z+) → R+, where P(Z+) is the set of
probability mass functions over the set of non-negative integers. One such
function is:
• The log-loss function, l(x,Py) = − logPy(x). Suppose X and Y are
correlated random variables and X is to be estimated based on the ob-
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servation of Y , then argming(Y )E
[− logPg(Y )(X)] = PX|Y (X|Y )
and the resulting loss is given by E
[− log(PX|Y (X|Y )] = H(X|Y ),
the conditional entropy of X given Y , also known as equivocation.
Most of the results derived in the earlier chapters rely on the following fact,
which is a generalization of the data processing inequality in information theory.
Theorem 9.1. If X−Y −Z forms a Markov chain, then, using just Y to estimate
X results in the same loss as using both Y and Z. Also, using Y to estimate X
results in a lower loss than using Z:
min
h(·)
E[l(X, h(Y, Z))] = min
g(·)
E[l(X, g(Y ))] ≤ min
g˜(·)
E[l(X, g˜(Z))]. (9.2)
Proof. Expanding the expectations, we have
min
h(·)
E[l(X, h(Y, Z))]
= min
h(·)
∫
Y,Z
∫
X
l(x, h(y, z))fX|Y,Z(x|y, z)dxfY,Z(y, z)dydz
= min
h(·)
∫
Y,Z
∫
X
l(x, h(y, z))fX|Y (x|y)dxfY,Z(y, z)dydz (9.3)
≥ min
h(·)
∫
X,Y
∫
Z
l(x, h(y, c(y, h)))fZ|Y (z|y)dzfX,Y (x, y)dxdy (9.4)
= min
h(·)
∫
Y
∫
X
l(x, h(y, c(y, h)))fX|Y (x|y)dxfY (y)dy (9.5)
= min
h(·)
E [l(X, h(Y, c(Y, h)))]
= min
g(·)
E [l(X, g(Y ))] , (9.6)
where (9.3) holds true because X − Y − Z is a Markov chain, and by definition,
fX|Y,Z(x|y, z) = fX|Y (x|y); in (9.4),
c(y, h) = argmin
z
∫
X
l(x, h(y, z))fX|Y (x|y)dx,
and this minimizer is dependent only on the variable y and the function h(·); and
in (9.5), we have integrated out the random variable Z.
The inequality minh(·)E[l(X, h(Y, Z))] ≤ ming˜(·)E[l(X, g˜(Z))] trivially holds
true because we are optimizing over a larger function space. For the same reason,
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we have minh(·)E[l(X, h(Y, Z))] ≤ ming(·)E[l(X, g(Y ))]. Together with (9.6),
we have a proof of the statement of the theorem.
The results derived in earlier chapters hold true due to the following reasons.
1. FCFS and TDMA represent the policies with the worst and best pri-
vacy respectively. Recall that by using the attack strategy described in the
proof of Theorem 4.2, when the attacker, Bob, issues his jobs frequently
enough, he learns the arrival pattern of Alice exactly. Therefore, for each
Xk, he picks that estimate which results in the least loss, and as a result,
Pc,λ2,l(·,·)FCFS = E[l(Xk, c(Xk))], where c(x) = argminy l(x, y). Now instead,
if the scheduler uses a TDMA policy, the arrival and departure processes of
Bob are independent of Alice’s arrivals. In this case, the best estimate that
results in minimal loss is c = argminy E[l(x, y)]. Let tn1 , s
n
1 , and t
′n
1 be the
arrivals times, sizes of jobs and departure times of jobs issued by Bob when
the policy is any other scheduling policy. Then,
E[min
y
l(Xk, y)] ≤ min
gNk (·)
E[l(Xk, g
N
k (t
n
1 , s
n
1 , t
′n
1 ))] ≤ min
y
E[l(Xk, y)],
and as a consequence, Pc,λ2,l(·,·)TDMA ≥ Pc,λ2,l(·,·)Scheduling policy ≥ Pc,λ2,l(·,·)FCFS .
2. Round-robin policy is a privacy optimal policy within the class of work-
conserving policies. This result was proved by first proving that a policy
that gives priority to jobs from the attacker, Bob, was a privacy optimal
work-conserving scheduling policy, as shown in Theorem 5.3. It was shown
that the departures seen by the attacker when the priority policy is used is
a deterministic function of the departures seen by him when another work-
conserving policy is used. The result does not depend on the metric used
to quantify privacy. In addition, the following mathematical property about
estimation errors was used in the proof which holds true more generally as
well. The more information the attacker has, the lower the incurred loss,
proved in Theorem 9.1. Next, the attack designed against the priority pol-
icy, described in Section 5.1 reveals to the attacker the start and end times
of the busy periods of the scheduling system. In the limit the job sizes is-
sued by the attacker go to zero; this information is the same as the busy
periods of a system in which Alice is the only user, and the scheduler serves
her in a work-conserving manner. In Theorem 5.9, we prove that the es-
timation error incurred by any attacker against the round robin policy is
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lower bounded by the error incurred when he is given the side informa-
tion, the busy periods of a system in which Alice is the only user. The
proof of that theorem was independent of the metric as well. Thus, we have
Pc,λ2,l(·,·)RR ≥ Pc,λ2,l(·,·)work−conserving.
3. Accumulate and serve and proportional-TDMA provide guaranteed
levels of privacy: Both these polices, by the nature of their design pro-
vide only coarse grained information about Alice’s arrival pattern. It was
shown that when either of these two policies is used, the attacker learns at
most the total number of jobs which arrive from Alice in a certain number
of clock periods. The privacy offered by the accumulate and serve policy is
lower bounded by
Pc,λ2,l(·,·)AccServe ≥
1
T
T∑
k=1
min
gk(·)
E
[
l
(
Xk, gk
(
T∑
i=1
Xi
))]
, (9.7)
where T is the accumulate period. The proportional-TDMA policy pro-
vides the same guarantees on privacy with the T being replaced by M , the
adaptation period.
Given this, it needs to be noted that our conclusion that work-conserving poli-
cies do not fare as well as idling policies in terms of privacy need not hold true for
every loss function. Recall that this claim was made by computing the estimation
error based privacy metric using techniques described in Section 5.3 and noting
that for most reasonable values of λ2, the arrival rate from Alice, the estimation
error was quite low for the round-robin policy, the best work-conserving policy.
Also, for the additional delay that they add, the degree of privacy provided by the
accumulate and serve and the proportional-TDMA policies might not be sufficient
for every possible loss function. Recall that for the estimation error based privacy
metric, an accumulate period T guarantees that the privacy is (1− c
T
)+ of that of
TDMA.
9.2 Discussion on Modeling Assumptions
In Chapter 3, we described the system model in detail. Several assumptions were
made to make the problem tractable, ensure that the solutions derived are appli-
cable to a wide variety of systems, and to understand the fundamental tradeoffs
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between performance of a scheduling system and its privacy. In this section we
comment on how important these modeling assumptions are to the results derived
in this thesis.
The arrivals from the innocuous user Alice were modeled as being a Poisson
process. This is perhaps the least crucial of the assumptions made and can easily
be relaxed. FCFS offers zero privacy irrespective of how Alice’s jobs arrive to the
scheduling system. TDMA continues to be the most secure policy. Round-robin
continues to be the work-conserving policy that offers the highest privacy. This is
true because the attacker continues to learn about the busy periods of the system
using the same attack described in Section 5.1, which is also the maximum infor-
mation that the attacker can learn. Finally, the derived policies accumulate and
serve, and proportional-TDMA continue to provide guaranteed levels of privacy.
The jobs from the innocuous user, Alice, were assumed to have unit size. This
was motivated by considering a computer network, wherein, the size of packets
sent on a link is usually the largest size allowed on that link. This is done so to
minimize the overhead used by the packet headers. In other applications, it is
very likely that different jobs have different sizes. If this were the case, we would
first have to alter the privacy metric slightly. Instead of the attacker estimating
the count of the jobs that arrive in each clock period, a more meaningful scenario
would be one where the attacker estimates the volume of jobs that arrive in each
clock period, i.e., the sum of the sizes of all the jobs that arrive in each clock
period. On the modified metric, the results derived in here would change as fol-
lows. FCFS and TDMA continue to be the worst and best policies respectively on
the privacy metric. Against the round-robin policy, the attacker would continue
to learn the start and end times of the busy periods and the departures within this
busy period. This is also the maximum information that the attacker can possibly
extract. Therefore, one can compute the privacy metric of the round-robin policy
exactly. However, it is not clear if the round-robin policy is the work-conserving
policy with the highest privacy metric or not. This is because, when the jobs are
not unit sized, the fictitious policy that gives priority to jobs from the attacker is
not necessarily a privacy-optimal work-conserving policy. Under what assump-
tions on the distribution of the job sizes is round-robin a privacy-optimal work-
conserving policy is an interesting open question. Again, the derived policies
accumulate and serve, and proportional-TDMA continue to provide guaranteed
levels of privacy even when the job sizes of Alice are not unit sized.
Again motivated by a computer network scenario, we assumed that the attacker
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can issue arbitrarily small sized jobs, which served as a reasonable approxima-
tion for the fact that the smallest packet that can be sent on an ethernet link is
typically tens of bytes, whereas the largest packets have a size of more than a
thousand bytes. We believe that in a large number of systems, the attacker should
be able to send small jobs. If this were not the case, the results derived can change
significantly. TDMA, proportional-TDMA and accumulate and serve continue to
provide guaranteed levels of security. Using a different attacker strategy wherein
the attacker attempts to overwhelm the scheduler by issuing a large number of
jobs, it can be shown that FCFS offers the least privacy in this scenario as well.
Refer to our work in [57]. If both the attacker and the user could issue only unit
sized jobs, as shown in [58], the policy that gives priority to jobs from the attacker
is a privacy-optimal work-conserving policy. In this scenario, we cannot however
comment on the performance of the round-robin policy. The attack described in
Section 5.1 need not be the best attack against the round-robin policy. Having
said these, it should be noted that having minimal constraints on the set of strate-
gies available to the attacker means that the derived privacy metric is conservative.
This means that if there are other constraints on the arrivals from the attacker, the
policies will only provide greater privacy to the users.
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